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Andrew Brady Spalding*
ABSTRACT
Although the purpose of international anti-bribery legislation,
particularly the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), is to deter
bribery, empirical evidence demonstrates a problematic collateral effect.
In countries where bribery is perceived to be relatively common, the
present enforcement regime goes beyond the deterrence of bribery, and
ultimately deters investment. Drawing on literature from political
science and economics, this Article argues that anti-bribery legislation,
as presently enforced, functions as de facto economic sanctions. A
detailed analysis of the history of FCPA enforcement shows that these
sanctions most often occur in emerging markets, where historic
opportunities for economic and social development otherwise exist and
where public policy should encourage investment. This effect is
contrary to the FCPA’s purpose which, as the legislative history shows,
is to build economic and political alliances by promoting ethical
overseas investment.
These perverse and unanticipated consequences create two policy
problems. First, the sanctions literature suggests that capital-rich
countries that are not committed to effectively enforcing anti-bribery
measures may fill the resulting foreign direct investment void. This
dynamic creates myriad ethical, economic, and foreign policy problems,
as observed, for example, in China’s aggressive investment in Africa,
Latin America, and Central Asia. Second, by enforcing these laws
without regard to their sanctioning effects, developed nations are
unwittingly sacrificing poverty reduction opportunities to combat
bribery. This Article concludes with various proposed reforms to the
text and enforcement of international anti-bribery legislation that would
further the goal of deterring bribery without deterring investment.

* Fulbright Senior Research Scholar, Mumbai, India; Visiting Scholar, The University
of Mumbai Government Law College; Ph.D., Political Science, The University of Wisconsin,
Madison; J.D., The University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I would like to thank Gordon Smith, Tom
Miles, Bob Lawless, Ellen Podgor, Larry Solum, Dick Cassin, Nancy Rapoport, and Steve
Johnson for their comments and support. Thanks to Robert Hatch for his research assistance. An
earlier version of this Article was placed on Transnational Dispute Management,
www.transnational-dispute-management.com.
351

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 2

352

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 353

II.

THE TEXT OF THE FCPA: PUNISHING THE SUPPLIER AND NOT THE
RECIPIENT .................................................................................... 358
A. Historical Context: Bribery as a Foreign
Policy Problem ................................................................... 359
B. The FCPA’s Exclusive Focus on the Supply
of Bribes .............................................................................. 360
C. The “Grease Payment” Exception and the Written Law
Defense: Tolerating Host-Country Bribery ........................ 364

III.

THE FCPA AS ENFORCED: DE FACTO SANCTIONS AGAINST
EMERGING MARKETS ................................................................... 366
A. Defining Economic Sanctions: Drawing Upon Political
Science and Economics ....................................................... 367
B. The Effect of Anti-Bribery Enforcement: Economic
Withdrawal from Countries Where Bribery is Perceived
to be More Prevalent ........................................................... 371
C. The FCPA Enforcement Focus on Emerging Markets ........ 374
D. Putting the Pieces Together: Anti-Bribery Enforcement
as De Facto Sanctions Against Emerging Markets............. 376

IV.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: BUILDING ALLIANCES
THROUGH ETHICAL INVESTMENT ................................................. 378
A. The Early Disputes Over the Scope of the Problem
and the Appropriate Remedy ............................................... 379
B. The Early Consensus: Anti-Bribery Legislation as an
Alliance-Building Instrument .............................................. 384
C. Affirming the Consensus in Amending the FCPA
Twenty Years Later ............................................................. 390

V. THE CONUNDRUM OF UNWITTING SANCTIONS ............................. 396
A. The Likely Effects of the Present Enforcement Regime ...... 396
B. Policy Problems Inherent in the Present
Enforcement Regime ........................................................... 398
C. Proposed Reforms: Deterring Bribery Without
Deterring Investment ........................................................... 401
VI. CONCLUSION: DESTINED TO REPEAT HISTORY? ........................... 406
VII. APPENDIX: CATEGORIZING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
BY MARKET TYPE ........................................................................ 408

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/2

2

Spalding: Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Ec

2010]

ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION

353

I. INTRODUCTION
Legislation prohibiting the bribery of overseas officials for business
purposes has rapidly risen from relative obscurity to become among the
most significant legal issues in international commerce. Although the
United States passed the first statute of its kind, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA),1 over thirty years ago, a number of economic and
political factors contributed to an early pattern of only sporadic
enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).2 Then in the late 1990s
and the following decade, a number of historical events combined to
precipitate a dramatic increase in enforcement of anti-bribery
legislation.3 Not least of these was the 1997 adoption by the member
states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)4 of a convention obligating signatory countries to enact FCPAtype legislation.5 The adoption of that convention marked a sea change
in worldwide attitudes toward bribery and the emergence of an
international, but not universal, commitment in principle to enforcing
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)–(h), 78dd(1)–(3), 78ff (2006)),
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)–(3), 78ff (2006)); International AntiBribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)–(3), 78ff (2006)).
2. See Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include
a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 192–95 (1994).
3. For explanations for the dramatic surge in enforcement, see David C. Weiss, Note,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving
International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30
MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 484–85 (2009). See also Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions:
Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1447–49 (2008); Eugene R. Erbstoesser, John
H. Sturc & John W.F. Chesley, The FCPA and Analogous Foreign Anti-Bribery Laws—
Overview, Recent Developments, and Acquisition Due Diligence, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 381,
386–94 (2007) (discussing briefly the most significant enforcement efforts); Mike Koehler, A
Malady in Search of a Cure—The Increase in FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Health-Care
Companies, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 261, 262, 282 (2008).
4. Founded in 1961, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
“brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy
from around the world to: [s]upport sustainable growth; [b]oost employment, raise living
standards; [m]aintain financial stability; [a]ssist other countries’ economic development; [and
c]ontribute to growth in world trade[.]” See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development , About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
5. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17,
1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD
Convention]. For a catalogue of each member country’s implementing legislation, see Weiss,
supra note 3, at 488–89 n.101, 490–91 n.103.
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bribery prohibitions.6 No longer at a competitive disadvantage,7 the
United States resolved to finally give teeth to the FCPA, and the rate of
enforcement has since accelerated dramatically.8 This trend is likely to
continue, as the DOJ has described the exponential increase in
enforcement actions over the last several years as “the tip of the
iceberg.”9
Although the frequency of anti-bribery law enforcement has risen
sharply, it has not yet produced a commensurate rise in legal
scholarship. While scholars over the last thirty years have explored such
issues as the moral and economic justifications for the legislation,10 the
problem of cultural relativism,11 the statute’s underlying theories of
6. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1998
OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in
Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 485-86 (2000); Barbara Crutchfield George,
Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery
Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward the
Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 3, 37 (1999).
7. For the legislative history reflecting initial concerns about a competitive disadvantage
and an ultimate determination that the OECD convention would supply the remedy, see infra
Part IV.A, Part IV.C.
8. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING
TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, at 2
(2009), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA_Digest.pdf [hereinafter
FCPA DIGEST]. Another prominent FCPA practice has characterized the recent enforcement
pace as “frenetic.” Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Publications, 2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update
(July 7, 2008), http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx.
9. For example, the number of FCPA-related enforcement actions by the SEC and DOJ
over the last four years is roughly ten times the number of actions from the five years preceding
the OECD Convention. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. STESKAL, FENWICK & WEST LLP, SECURITIES
LITIGATION ALERT: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: THE NEXT CORPORATE SCANDAL? 3
(2008), available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/Litigation/sec/Sec_Litigation
_Alert_01-28-08.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Beverley Earle, The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won’t Work, Try the Money
Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 207, 207–09 (1996) (exploring the influence of Transparency
International on the corruption debate); Marie M. Dalton, Note, Efficiency v. Morality: The
Codification of Cultural Norms in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS.
583, 583–84 (2006) (juxtaposing moral and economic justifications for prohibiting bribery);
Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Comment, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 861–62 (2001).
11. See, e.g., Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A
Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
877, 894 (2000) (arguing that claims of universal morality have justified exploitation by the
“north” of the “south”); Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to
Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 421–22 (1999) (casting anti-bribery legislation as a
form of cultural imperialism); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 280 (1997)
(characterizing such legislation as culturally insensitive); Christopher J. Duncan, Comment, The
1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?, 1
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liability,12 and issues associated with extraterritorial application,13 they
have yet to engage the more fundamental questions concerning whether
the statute’s impact is congruent with its underlying policies. The surge
in enforcement activity provides a data set from which scholars can
begin to study these effects. While the legislation has almost certainly
succeeded to some extent in achieving its manifest purpose of curbing
bribery,14 the data thus far strongly suggest an additional and more
problematic outcome: Companies subject to anti-bribery legislation are
investing less in countries where bribery is perceived to be more
prevalent.15 The difference is subtle, but critically important:
Enforcement of anti-bribery legislation is not just deterring bribery, but
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 16:1, 16:3–:6, & 16:4 n.14 (2000) (exploring, generally, the cultural
clash that anti-bribery enforcement creates in developing countries).
12. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (analyzing parent liability under both the
accounting and anti-bribery provisions); Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little
More Action: Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 285–86 (2007)
(describing the theories of liability behind the new era of enforcement); Pines, supra note 2, at
195.
13. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?,
26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239 (2001) (exploring various justifications for international
jurisdiction); Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar
Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 325 (1997) (looking at the problem of extraterritorial criminal
prosecution).
14. Many have argued that enforcement could, or should, be more effective. See, e.g., Tor
Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 85, 92 (2007) (contending that the legislation has had insufficient
impact on bribery); Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 509, 511 (1997)
(finding the pre-OECD legislation to be ineffective at curbing bribery); Philip Segal, Coming
Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169, 175 (2006) (concluding that legislation is under-enforced due to
enforcement costs); Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665, 669–73 (2004) (using game theory to
explain why enforcement has not been more rigorous); Alexandros Zervos, Amending the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Repealing the Exemption for “Routine Government Action”
Payments, 25 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 251, 254 (2006) (suggesting repealing the grease payment
exemption to combat lower-level corruption); Andrea Goldbarg, Note, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and Structural Corruption, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 273, 275 (2000) (discussing the
legislation and criticizing it for treating the symptoms rather than the causes of corruption);
Rebecca Koch, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s Time to Cut Back the Grease and
Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 380 (2005) (taking issue with the
grease payment exception).
15. See, e.g., Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad,
39 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 634, 635 (2008) [hereinafter Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws];
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 807, 807 (2006)
[hereinafter Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares].
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is deterring investment.
It is easy to assume, as many do today, that deterring investment in
bribery-prone countries is the legislation’s tacit purpose—that economic
withdrawal from such countries is the natural and expected, if not
intended, outcome of anti-bribery legislation. According to this view,
we can and should assess the legislation’s effectiveness by the extent to
which it “induc[es] [foreign] investors . . . to reduce their investments in
corrupt countries.”16 This view further holds that developed nations can
effectively combat overseas bribery by economically disengaging from
the countries whose governments tolerate it. Because developing
countries depend on foreign investment to stimulate economic
development, their governments will eventually succumb to pressure
and implement reforms.
There is of course a familiar, if not altogether comfortable, term for
this phenomenon: economic sanctions.17 The discomfort arises from a
widely-shared concern that the victims of the sanctioned practice, rather
than the perpetrators, will feel the brunt of the sanctions’ impact. We
may further suspect that despite these costs, the sanctions will fail to
effect meaningful reform. Our fears are likely more pronounced where
the target country is poor; they may be more pronounced yet when the
country otherwise enjoys economic conditions that are highly conducive
to growth.
Regrettably, anti-bribery legislation tends to sanction precisely these
countries. Accordingly, although scholars and regulators have not
previously applied the label of economic sanctions to the FCPA and its
progeny, the data and literature suggest that we should do so now.
Scholars must begin to wrestle with its implications, and to critically
examine the assumption that the operation of anti-bribery legislation as
de facto sanctions constitutes a successful implementation of the
statute’s underlying policies.
This Article argues firmly that it does not. Focusing in depth on the
FCPA as the origin and template for international anti-bribery
legislation,18 this Article shows that the legislation evinces no design to
function as de facto sanctions. Two principal sources support this
argument, the first of which is well-known, though the second is not.
The first is the statute’s text, which plainly applies only to the suppliers

16. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15, at 635.
17. See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT &
BARBARA OEGG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed. 2007) (discussing economic
sanctions).
18. For a discussion of the FCPA as a predecessor to the OECD, see, for example, Brown,
supra note 13, at 265–320; DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT § 13:2 (2000).
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of bribes.19 The text does not provide for the punishment of the
recipients or solicitors of bribes, much less the governments that tolerate
them. The second source is much more illuminating on this question,
though astonishingly, almost completely unknown among lawyers and
scholars. That source is the statute’s legislative history, which has not
been analyzed at meaningful length in the academic scholarship on antibribery legislation.20 A thorough examination of the legislative history
reveals absolutely no basis for the proposition that the legislation should
punish governments that tolerate bribery by withdrawing financial
support in the hopes that economic hardship might incentivize reform.
Businessmen, interest group leaders, congressmen, members of three
presidential administrations, and indeed three U.S. Presidents, spanning
both political parties and more than twenty years, provided statements
on the legislative record relevant to this question, and did so in virtual
unanimity.21 While they specifically considered the practical effects of
this legislation, they never contemplated that those effects would
resemble economic sanctions.
Indeed, they believed exactly the opposite. A study of the statute’s
history, similar to the text, very strongly supports an altogether different
mechanism for achieving the statute’s goal of promoting ethical
overseas business practices. Those who participated in congressional
hearings on the need for the legislation prohibiting overseas bribery
clearly expected the statute to encourage investment in transitional
economies to promote their development and build economic and
political alliances.22 The legislative history portrays the FCPA as a
product of two formative events: Watergate and the Cold War. While
the former’s influence is widely recognized, the latter has been largely
forgotten.23 Taken together, these events exposed a degree of corruption
in U.S. business and government that, according to those who testified
before Congress, tarnished the U.S. image abroad and weakened its
standing in a bi-polar political struggle. To build and preserve critical
alliances, the United States sought to announce to the world its intention
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. For a thorough discussion of the procedural (but not thematic) legislative history of
the FCPA, see GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 17–19 (1982).
21. See infra Part IV.A & Part IV.B.
22. See infra Part IV.A & Part IV.B.
23. For a rare, albeit brief, account of the FCPA’s historical context that recognizes the
importance of foreign policy considerations (and tacitly acknowledges the Cold War), see
RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 392 (2005) (“The FCPA is a response to real
and perceived harm to U.S. foreign relations with important, developed friendly nations, and the
interest of the United States to prevent U.S. persons from making payments which might
embarrass the United States in conducting foreign policy.”).
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to implement the highest standards of business ethics. Through its
continued engagement in—rather than withdrawal from—fragile
transitional economies, the United States would promote ethics and
economic development while advancing its foreign policy goals. This is
the logic on which the FCPA was founded, and it is not the logic of
sanctions.
The FCPA ultimately proves to be a large-scale study in the law of
unintended consequences. Part II of this Article provides an
introduction to the statute and shows that its manifest purpose is to
punish those who supply bribes, and not to punish the recipients or
solicitors, much less their governments or their fellow citizens. Part III
demonstrates that the FCPA and related legislation, as presently
enforced, constitute de facto economic sanctions against emerging
markets. It first discusses the political science and economics literature
regarding the purpose and effects of economic sanctions. It then
discusses the quantitative evidence on the effects of anti-bribery
enforcement, and shows that it is appropriate and useful to think of antibribery legislation, as currently enforced, as de facto economic
sanctions. It further shows that the majority of the FCPA enforcement
actions have occurred in economies that are today regarded as emerging
markets, and that the economic sanctions therefore have their principal
effect in countries that otherwise present historic opportunities for
economic growth. Part IV explores for the first time in academic legal
literature the legislative history of the FCPA. It introduces the colorful
and animated disagreement on numerous fundamental issues
surrounding the need for anti-bribery legislation, and then the striking
unanimity on the statute’s fundamental purpose: to promote, and not
deter, investment in developing economies. Part V offers proposed
reforms—including expanded membership in the OECD, the
promulgation of more demand-side anti-bribery laws, and a reevaluation
of the underlying theories of liability under the FCPA—that might
enable the statute to achieve its manifest purpose of curbing bribery
without collaterally curbing investment. Part VI concludes that
sanctioning emerging markets to effect bribery-reducing reforms is an
enterprise fraught with ethical, economic, and foreign policy risks that
scholars and policymakers should promptly address.
II. THE TEXT OF THE FCPA: PUNISHING THE SUPPLIER AND NOT THE
RECIPIENT
This Part provides a brief historical account of the FCPA’s origins
and introduces the statute’s core provisions. Specifically, this Part
argues that scholars to date have only partially understood the historical
events that precipitated the introduction and passage of anti-corruption
legislation. A more complete understanding of the FCPA’s context
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reveals that the statute was designed as a tool of foreign policy, and not
merely of business ethics. Notably it is a foreign policy tool that evinces
no design to control foreign actors or to ultimately sanction foreign
governments. The statute’s text makes abundantly clear that the statute
is designed to impact the supplier of bribes rather than the solicitors,
recipients, or the governments that tolerate them. Moreover, the
statute’s purpose of punishing suppliers, rather than foreign
governments, is further suggested by one statutory exception and one
affirmative defense.
A. Historical Context: Bribery as a Foreign Policy Problem
Scholars attempting to describe the origins of the FCPA have
produced several variations on the following theme.24 The Watergate
scandal in the early 1970s exposed illegal payments made by numerous
U.S. companies to domestic political campaigns. In response to this
discovery, in 1974 the SEC conducted an investigation and determined
that payments were made not only to U.S. political campaigns, but to
overseas campaigns and officers as well, and were typically accounted
for through “slush funds.” As part of the post-Watergate reforms,
Congress sought to supplement existing domestic anti-bribery
legislation with comparable legislation that would prohibit payments to
overseas officials and require more accurate accounting.
This story thus accurately characterizes the FCPA as an outgrowth of
the post-Watergate domestic crisis in confidence. Americans had lost a
degree of trust in their political and business leaders, and this legislation
would help to ensure the proper conduct of U.S. business. By this
account, it is quite predictable and not particularly noteworthy that the
ensuing legislation primarily sought to punish companies and
individuals doing some substantial portion of their business in or
through the United States. Watergate, after all, was a domestic problem;
the solution was a matter of domestic policy, meant primarily to punish
domestic actors.
This conventional story is true, but it is not the whole truth. Indeed,
there was another event involving bribery that likewise alerted Congress
to the need for legislation prohibiting overseas payments, and which
24. See, e.g., Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against
Foreign Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International Lawyer, 5 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006); Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International
Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 593, 595–96 (2002); Stanley Sporkin, The
Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its
Twentieth Birthday, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 269, 271–75 (1998); Daniel Patrick Ashe,
Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent Extraterritorial
Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2902–03
(2005).
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almost immediately produced congressional hearings. This event,
however, occurred prior to and independently of Watergate. In 1971,
Congress provided the Lockheed Corporation,25 then a major
manufacturer of civilian and military aircraft, with a $250 million
federal loan guarantee to prevent bankruptcy.26 Soon afterwards,
regulators discovered that Lockheed had, over the course of many years,
paid numerous bribes to foreign governments to secure contracts.27 By
the time of the earliest congressional hearings concerning the need for
international anti-bribery legislation, Lockheed had already disclosed to
the United States government that it had paid several multi-million
dollar bribes to various developed and developing countries, particularly
the Netherlands, Japan, and Italy, and had caused scandals in each of
those countries that were embarrassing both to those countries and to
the United States.28
Because these bribes were paid to foreign governments and
provoked public outcry in those countries, they were not merely a
domestic policy problem; rather, they raised the issue of U.S. relations
with foreign countries, and the solution would necessarily implicate
foreign policy interests. As will be shown below, the ensuing legislation
was in fact widely understood as an instrument of foreign policy,
intended to impact relations between the United States and other
nations, and not merely a component of a domestic ethics crisis. In light
of the Lockheed payments, and the recognition that they constituted a
foreign policy problem in need of a foreign policy solution, it is far
more notable that the legislation was not designed to punish the
recipients or solicitors of such bribes, let alone the governments that
tolerate bribery. This foreign policy tool, both as originally passed and
subsequently amended, was drafted to target and punish only the
suppliers of bribes.
B. The FCPA’s Exclusive Focus on the Supply of Bribes
The statute’s exclusive focus on the supply of bribes is evident in the
persons who are subject to its prohibitions and the bases of jurisdiction
over them, as well as the definition of the prohibited conduct. The anti25. Lockheed Corporation merged with Martin Marietta Corporation in 1995 to form the
Lockheed Martin Corporation. Company News; Martin Marietta-Lockheed Merger Is Approved,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at D4.
26. Lockheed Bribery: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Banking Hearing] (statement of Sen.
William Proxmire).
27. See Lockheed’s Defiance: A Right to Bribe?, TIME, Aug. 18, 1975, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,917751-1,00.html.
28. 1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 40–42 (statement of Sen. William
Proxmire).
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bribery provisions of the statute apply to three different classes of
persons: “issuers,”29 “domestic concerns,”30 and “persons other than
issuers or domestic concerns.”31 First, the anti-bribery provisions apply
to any issuer that has a class of securities registered under § 12 of the
Exchange Act or which is required to file reports under § 15(d) of that
act. This prohibition applies to any officer, director, employee, or agent
of such an issuer, or any stockholder acting on behalf of that issuer.32
The 1977 Senate Report explains that the purpose of this phrase is to
make clear that it is corporate or business bribery which is being
proscribed, rather than individual bribery.33 Second, “domestic concern”
is “any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States,”34 and applies to commercial entities including “any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized
under the laws of a [U.S. state,] territory, possession, or
commonwealth.”35 The 1977 Senate Report elaborates that this latter
section is intended to apply to entities which are “owned or controlled
by individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United States” and
have their principal place of business in the United States or a territory,
possession, or commonwealth.36 The third category of person subject to
the anti-bribery sections is first identified as a “person,” other than an
issuer or domestic concern, who is in the “territory” of the United States
at the time of the conduct in question,37 and who is not a national of the
United States or a commercial entity legally organized in the United
States.38 This third category was established by the FCPA’s 1998
amendments to satisfy the OECD convention’s requirement that statutes
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
30. Id. § 78dd-2 (2006).
31. Id. § 78dd-3 (2006).
32. Id. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
33. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
Whether an act of bribery is determined to be “by the corporation or by an individual acting on
his own will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including the position of the employee,
the care with which the board of directors supervises management, the care with which
management supervises employees in sensitive positions and its adherence to the strict
accounting standards” provided in the section. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A) (2006).
35. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B) (2006).
36. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 17. For more recent comments by the U.S. Department of
Justice, see DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAY-PERSON’S GUIDE TO FCPA § A, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html [hereinafter DOJ GUIDE] (“U.S. parent
corporations may be held liable for the acts of foreign subsidiaries where they authorized,
directed, or controlled the activity in question.”).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006).
38. Id. § 78dd-3(f)(1) (2006).
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cover “any person.”39 As a result of this amendment, foreign
corporations, even if subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation, as well as the
employees of such corporations, may now be independently liable under
the FCPA.40 However, liability continues to attach only to the supplier,
rather than the recipient or solicitor of the bribe, and the supplier must
have done business in or through the United States. Even after the
modifications of the FCPA to conform it to the OECD convention, the
legislation remains targeted exclusively at suppliers.
As originally drafted, the statute required the traditional
jurisdictional hook for expansive congressional action: that the conduct
occurred through “any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce.”41 The 1998 amendments provided an additional basis of
jurisdiction, the nationality principle of jurisdiction,42 codified with the
section heading “Alternative jurisdiction.”43 With that amendment it
became illegal for any issuer or domestic concern or an officer, director,
employee, or agent thereof who is a “United States person,”44 “to
corruptly do any act outside the United States in furtherance of” a bribe
or authorization of a bribe irrespective of whether the payor used
interstate commerce.45 This language implements the OECD
Convention’s requirement that member nations extend coverage of their
anti-bribery statutes to acts outside the United States.46 Although the
language limits liability to conduct taken by persons on behalf of issuers
or domestic concerns, the legislative history indicates an intention that
“principles of liability, including principles of vicarious liability”
already applicable under the FCPA would render U.S. issuers or
domestic concerns liable for the conduct of officers, directors,
employees, agents, or stockholders outside of the United States
regardless of their nationality.47 As a result of the 1998 amendments,
U.S. issuers and domestic concerns may now be liable under either
territorial or nationality jurisdictional principles.48 But even taken
39. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998).
40. See ZARIN, supra note 18, at 4–9; see also Mike Koehler, Why Compliance with the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Matters in China, CHINA L. & PRAC. (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396267.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
42. ZARIN, supra note 18, at 4–12.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i) (2006).
44. A “United States person,” in this context, is defined as any “national of the United
States . . . or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the United
States” or its territory, etc. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g)(2) (2006).
45. Id. § 78dd-1(g)(1).
46. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998).
47. Id. at 4.
48. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at § A. This new section does not depend on the Interstate
Commerce Clause to establish jurisdiction. Rather, it falls under Congress’ constitutional

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/2

12

Spalding: Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Ec

2010]

ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION

363

together, it remains true that the statute reaches only those corporations
and individuals that have substantial ties of some kind to the United
States. Its intended target remains fairly close-range.
The proscribed conduct involves three elements: the payment, the
recipient, and the purpose. It defines the payment as the “furtherance of
an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving
of anything of value.”49 After defining the payment, it defines the
persons to whom the payment must be made to violate the FCPA. First
is any “foreign official,”50 which is “any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof.”51 Second is any foreign political party or party official or any
candidate for foreign political office.52 The third group consists of third
parties, such as agents, distributors, or joint venture partners,53 defined
in the statute as any “person,” to whom money or a thing of value is
given while “knowing”54 that any portion of that money or thing of
value will be “offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,” to any
of the individuals in the first two groups above.55
For all three categories of recipients, the act must be done for one of
two prohibited purposes—direct influence or indirect influence. Under
direct influence,56 the payee is the person whom the payor seeks to
authority to “‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations’ and to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses
against the Law of Nations.’” S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cls. 3 & 10).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1); id. § 78dd-3(a)(1).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2006); id. §78dd-2(h)(2)(A); id. § 78dd-3(f)(2)(A). A
1977 House Report suggests that this definition should not include an employee “whose duties
are essentially ministerial or clerical.” H. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). After the 1998
amendments, language was added to provide that a foreign official may also include an officer
or employee of a “public international organization” or any person acting in an official capacity
for or on behalf of such an organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2006); id. § 78dd2(h)(2)(A); id. § 78dd-3(f)(2)(A). The purpose of this language is to comply with the OECD
Convention. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998). Nonetheless, The DOJ interprets this section to
hold that the prohibition applies to payments to “any public official, regardless of rank or
position,” and that it is meant to focus on the “purpose of the payment instead of the particular
duties of the official receiving” the bribe. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at § D.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(2) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(2); id. § 78dd-3(a)(2). This term is
not defined in the statute.
53. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at “Third Party Payments.”
54. In 1988, The statute expanded the definition of knowledge to include “deliberate
ignorance,” which under the statutory language is satisfied when a person is “aware of a high
probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such
circumstance does not exist.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(h)(3); id. § 78dd3(f)(3).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(3); id. § 78dd-3(a)(3).
56. Although, direct influence is not used in the statute in this context.
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influence. It can take any of three forms: 1) “influencing” of any “act or
decision” of that individual,57 2) “inducing” that individual to “do or
omit to do any act in violation” of that individual’s duty,58 or 3)
“securing any improper advantage” with that individual.59 The latter
phrase, “securing any improper advantage,” was added in 1998 to
mirror the language of the OECD Convention.60 Under indirect
influence, the payee is not the person whom the payor seeks to
influence, but is instead someone with the capacity to influence the
ultimate target. This category includes “inducing” that individual to
“use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof
to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality.”61
For both direct and indirect influence, the act must be done to assist
in “obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to,
any person,”62 commonly referred to as the business purpose test.63
Moreover, the 1977 House Report makes clear that the corrupt
requirement is satisfied even where the act is not “fully consummated,”
or does not “succeed in producing the desired outcome.”64
Again, these provisions, on their face, are directed only toward the
supplier. Even where the recipient is identified and defined in the
statute, it is not done to bring the recipient within the scope of the
FCPA’s punitive measures. Rather, the recipient is defined only to
further clarify the conduct that is prohibited for the would-be supplier.
C. The “Grease Payment” Exception and the Written Law
Defense: Tolerating Host-Country Bribery
The statute’s express exception, and one of its two affirmative
defenses, reflect a degree of tolerance of host-country bribery that
would not be expected from a statute designed to punish foreign
governments for condoning such conduct. The statutory exception is for
“facilitating or expediting” payments, otherwise known as “grease
payments,”65 which the statute defines as payments to a foreign official,
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(i); id. § 78dd3(a)(1)(A)(i).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(ii); id. § 78dd3(a)(1)(A)(ii).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)(iii) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(iii); id. § 78dd3(a)(1)(A)(iii).
60. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (citing OECD Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1,
para. 1).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(B) (2006); id. § 78dd-3(a)(1)(B); see id. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(B).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1); id. § 78dd-3(a)(1).
63. See DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at § E.
64. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
65. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
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political party, or party official intended “to expedite or to secure the
performance of a routine governmental action” by that payee.66 The
1977 House Report distinguishes facilitating payments from bribery by
distinguishing between payments that “cause an official to exercise
other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or
decision” versus payments that “merely move a particular matter toward
an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary
action.”67 An example provided in the legislative history is “a gratuity
paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a customs
document.”68 The statute further makes clear what routine governmental
action does not include: any decision by a foreign official “whether, or
on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with” a
party, or any action by a foreign official “involved in the decisionmaking process to encourage a decision to award new business to or
continue business” with a party.69 The 1977 Senate Report reaffirms
that this section is meant to apply to “grease payments.”70
In this context, the 1977 House Report demonstrates a degree of
cultural sensitivity to differing cultural norms surrounding conduct that
in the United States is considered bribery. It explains that while
facilitating payments “may be reprehensible in the United States, the
committee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere
in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States to attempt
unilaterally to eradicate all such payments.”71 Far from expressing
moral outrage, the report suggests that host-country bribery is to some
extent inevitable, and even tolerable.
This tolerance is more powerfully apparent in the statute’s
affirmative defense that the payment, gift, offer, or promise was legal
under the “written laws and regulations” of the payee’s country.72 The
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(b); id. § 78dd-3(b). The statute provides
categories of sample exceptions (although the common characteristic of the items in each
category is not always self-evident): “obtaining permits or licenses; processing visas or work
orders; providing police protection, mail service, or scheduling inspections related to crosscountry transit of goods; providing utilities service, loading or unloading cargo, or protecting
perishable products from deterioration; and ‘actions of a similar nature.’”15 U.S.C. § 78dd1(f)(3)(A)(i) to (v) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)(i) to (v); id. § 78dd-3(f)(4)(A)(i) to (v).
67. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
68. Id.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B); id. § 78dd-3(f)(4)(B).
70. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977). The statute provides the additional example of
placing a transatlantic telephone call. Id.
71. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(c)(1); id. § 78dd-3(c)(1). The statute
provides another affirmative defense that is less relevant to the present analysis—that the
payment, gift, offer, or promise was for a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure” that is by or
for the payor and was directly related to either: 1) the “promotion, demonstration, or explanation
of products or services,” or 2) “the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign
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adjective “written” was added in 1988 to “make clear that the absence
of written laws in a foreign official’s country would not by itself be
sufficient to satisfy this defense.”73 The absence of a prohibition against
bribery would not, then, be a defense, but the presence of a written law
expressly permitting such payments would be a defense. If host-country
reforms were the express object of the legislation, it is hard to imagine
that the FCPA would permit this defense.
Admittedly, neither the grease payment exception nor the written
law defense constitutes overwhelming evidence that reforming countries
perceived to have a greater tolerance for bribery is beyond the statute’s
purpose. But taken in conjunction with the core provisions, the message
becomes clear: The payor, and not the payee, is the party held
responsible under the statute. There is absolutely no part of the statute
suggesting that the solicitor, recipient, or its government should be held
responsible or punished for the bribe. The statute is thus “supply-side;”
the “demand-side” is well beyond its purview.
III. THE FCPA AS ENFORCED: DE FACTO SANCTIONS AGAINST
EMERGING MARKETS
Despite the plain meaning of the text (and, as will be shown in Part
IV, the legislative history) the enforcement of the statute has produced a
different result altogether. This part demonstrates that the FCPA, as
enforced, operates as de facto economic sanctions against countries
where substantial foreign direct investment is occurring and yet which
have substantial levels of corruption. Generally speaking, these will be
the emerging markets. While economists have for years been using
empirical data and quantitative methodologies to explore the collateral
effects of anti-bribery legislation, legal scholars have yet to recognize
the importance of their work and explore its implications. This section
seeks to repair that disconnect.
Part III.A draws on economic sanctions literature in economics and
political science to provide a framework for understanding the impact of
anti-bribery enforcement as sanctions. Part III.B discusses the
quantitative research showing that enforcement of anti-corruption
legislation has resulted not just in a reduction in bribery, but in a
reduction in investment in countries where bribery is perceived to be
more common—that is, the legislation effectively functions as
economic sanctions against such countries. Part III.C shows that a
majority of the FCPA prosecutions have occurred with respect to
government or agency thereof.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2)(A) to (B) (2006); id. § 78dd2(c)(2)(A) to (B); id. § 78dd-3(c)(2)(A) to (B). Examples provided in the statute include travel
and lodging expenses. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(c)(2); id. § 78dd-3(c)(2).
73. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 922 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1954.
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emerging markets. Part III.D thus arrives at the counterintuitive and
alarming conclusion that anti-bribery enforcement amounts to de facto
economic sanctions against emerging markets.
A. Defining Economic Sanctions: Drawing Upon Political
Science and Economics
The most comprehensive treatment of the definition, history, and
effectiveness of economic sanctions is the collaborative work of Gary
Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara
Oegg (HSEO), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.74 Originally
published in 1985 and updated in 1990 and then again in 2007, they
analyze 174 examples of economic sanctions, and draw upon the
literature in political science and economics to understand their purpose
and effect. Theirs and related work provide valuable groundwork for
evaluating the extent to which anti-bribery legislation may be regarded
as sanctions, and the extent to which it is likely to prove effective.
HSEO define sanctions as the “deliberate, government-inspired
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial
relations.”75 To a lawyer, this definition has four elements: the 1)
deliberate; 2) government-inspired; 3) withdrawal or threat of
withdrawal; 4) of customary trade or financial relations.76 In sanctions
jargon, the country applying the sanctions is often called the “sender”
and the sanctioned country is the “target.” With respect to the senders,
sanctions can be unilateral or multilateral, although the latter usually
involve major powers persuading their smaller allies to join.77 Sanctions
rarely turn out in practice to be a complete blockade, either because of
problems of enforcement, the so-called “black knights” that move in to
supply the prohibited goods, or in the case of multilateral sanctions, the
limited extent of international cooperation.78 Episodes thus vary greatly
74. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17.
75. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.
76. An alternative definition of sanctions suggests that any conduct that intentionally
deprives a people of its “means to an effective economic life” should be considered sanctions.
GEOFF SIMONS, IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LEGAL REMEDY OR GENOCIDAL TOOL? 11
(1999). This definition would even treat military conduct that adversely impacted a target’s
economy as sanctions, and is thus significantly broader than any generally accepted usage.
Another, more often used definition of sanctions is “coercive economic measures taken against
one or more countries to force a change in politics, or at least to demonstrate a country’s opinion
about the other’s policies.” DIANNE E. RENNACK & ROBERT D. SHUEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO
ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO CURRENT LAW 2 (1998), cited
in HOSSEIN G. ASKARI, JOHN FORRER, HILDY TEEGEN & JIAWEN YANG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
EXAMINING THEIR PHILOSOPHY AND EFFICACY 14 (2003). Because this definition disregards the
possibility that sanctions may be intended as expressive tools, and may or may not be designed
to “bring about a change in behavior or policies,” it is not used here.
77. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
78. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 57–58.
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in the degree of sanctioning that actually occurs. Sanctions can involve
any or all of three types of customary trade or financial relations:
limitations on imports, limitations on exports, and restricting the flow of
finance.79 The target country need not be the adversary of the sender,
and indeed, many of the most successful documented instances of
sanctions have involved a friendly target who promptly acquiesced to
the sender’s demands.80
The nature and function of sanctions have evolved historically; the
sanctions that are commonly used, and which the FCPA resembles in
important ways, are comparatively new. While the history of sanctions
can be traced as far back as Pericles’ Megarian Decree of 432 B.C.,
sanctions generally became a regular and integral instrument of foreign
policy, as a substitute for or at least a precursor to military action, after
World War I. Sanctions became much more prevalent after World War
II with the onset of the Cold War, as both the United States and the
Soviet Union sought to effect dramatic reform or even the all-out
collapse of various regimes within their respective spheres. The
sanctions they imposed were typically comprehensive, meaning that
they sought to produce a complete blockade of all relations with the
target country.
After the end of the Cold War, the scholarly and regulatory
community recognized that these comprehensive sanctions were
perhaps too blunt an instrument. They frequently resulted in undue
damage to the very people who were already victimized by an
oppressive government, or to neighboring countries. This collateral
damage would often occur despite the complete failure of the sanctions
to reform the target regime. Indeed, the multilateral sanctions against
Iraq that the UN imposed in 1990, and the colossal harm that resulted to
the Iraqi people, were perhaps the most dramatic example. In order to
continue to use sanctions to achieve foreign goals as an alternative to
military intervention while avoiding this collateral damage, countries
began to develop “targeted sanctions.”81 These sanctions involve more
specific, tailored methods to punish governing elites and disrupt their
activities while protecting the population.82 Examples have included
arms embargoes, travel bans (either general travel into or out of the
country, or travel restrictions on specific individuals or organizations)
or, commodity bans such as oil or diamonds (or, as in the case of North
Korea, banning the importation of luxury goods to deny its leader, Kim
79. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 44–45.
80. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 60.
81. See, e.g., David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart
Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 1,
2 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002).
82. See id.
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Jong-Il, some of his favorite habits). Most recently, the United States
has imposed various targeted sanctions to combat terrorism, such as
freezing the assets of designated foreign terrorist organizations or
prohibiting all transactions with specially designated terrorists.
Notably, these targeted sanctions are quite frequently administered
against an open-ended category of nations defined by their behavior,
rather than one or a few named nations. Examples have included the
prohibition on certain forms of assistance to former Soviet-bloc
countries for engaging in gross human rights violations (amendments to
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), the decision by the United States
to vote against the granting of loans by international financial
institutions to countries condoning female genital mutilation (part of the
Omnibus Appropriations Act for 1997) or the imposition of sanctions
against countries engaged in a pattern of religious persecution (the
International Religious Freedom Act).
Sanctions may serve either of two purposes, both of which are
relevant to the FCPA. While the most obvious purpose of economic
sanctions would be to “coerc[e] target governments into particular
avenues of response,”83 economists and political scientists have
explained that economic sanctions might also be designed to accomplish
an entirely different, non-instrumental goal. Under this alternative
theory, sanctions are not necessarily designed to effect reforms in the
target countries, and their success thus should not necessarily be
measured by the extent of any resulting reforms. William H. Kaempfer
and Anton D. Lowenberg have contrasted the “instrumental” theory of
sanctions with the “expressive” purpose.84 According to this theory, the
value of sanctions lies in “taking a moral stance against some other
nation’s objectionable behavior.”85 Where a target country offends the
sender state, but the sender’s leaders may deem more severe
intervention such as military action inappropriate, the sender’s leaders
may nonetheless feel compelled to “do something.”86 While the costs of
military action may be too high, the political costs of doing nothing may
be considerable to the extent that it projects weakness.87 Such domestic
political pressure can “persuade the government in the sanctioning
nation to respond by imposing sanctions to meet goals other than target
83. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
84. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, The Theory of International Economic
Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 786, 786 (1988).
85. Id.; see also PER LUNDBORG, THE ECONOMICS OF EXPORT EMBARGOES: THE CASE OF
THE US-SOVIET GRAIN SUSPENSION (1987).
86. Ivan Eland, Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
PANACEA OR PEACEBUILIDNG IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD? 29 (David Cortright & George
Lopez eds., 1995).
87. See generally DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999) (discussing political costs).
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compliance.”88 Indeed, the expressive purpose of sanctions sometimes
occurs despite its instrumental ineffectiveness, but often the sanctions
are “designed deliberately to be ineffectual.”89
Unlike expressive sanctions, measuring the effectiveness of
instrumental sanctions is a tricky and contested matter. HSEO have
developed a comprehensive rubric for evaluating the instrumental
success of sanctions, and have undertaken to identify the variables that
might explain those results. They recognize that the instrumental goals
of sanctions might lie anywhere on a spectrum that ranges from targeted
policy changes (such as curbing religious persecution or drug
trafficking), more dramatic policy changes (such as changing the
alliances of a smaller nation), impairing military capacity, disrupting a
military action, or ultimately, to completely changing the target
country’s regime.90 They have found that whether sanctions achieve
their intended result depends on quite a number of economic and
political variables. Among the political goals that bear the most
relevance to anti-corruption legislation include the extent of
international cooperation in enforcing the sanctions; whether both the
senders and targets are members of the international organization that is
coordinating the administration of the sanctions; the “warmth” of prior
relations between senders and targets; and the political system of the
target nations, ranging between autocratic and democratic.91 Economic
variables include the costs imposed on the target countries; the costs to
the sender countries; prior commercial relations between senders and
targets; the relative economic size of the targets and senders; and the
economic health and political stability of the targets.
Generally, targeted sanctions have thus far proven to be much less
successful than comprehensive sanctions in achieving their instrumental
goals. David Cortright and George Lopez, who have done the most
extensive work in the field of targeted sanctions, concluded that
“comprehensive, rigorously enforced sanctions are more likely to be
successful than limited, unenforced measures”92 while Kimberly Ann
Elliott has declared the collective experience of targeted sanctions
“disappointing.”93 Still, they remain an integral part of foreign policy,
88. Eland, supra note 86, at 29.
89. Id. Scholars have further debated the role of an expressive function in law more
generally. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2035 (1996).
90. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 52–53.
91. Id. at 55.
92. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 81, at 8.
93. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions, in SMART
SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, supra note 81, at 171; see also DAVID
CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ WITH RICHARD W. CONROY, JALEH DASHTI-GIBSON & JULIA
WAGLER , THE S ANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN S TRATEGIES IN THE 1990 S, at 209–12
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have numerous advantages over comprehensive sanctions, and, perhaps
with time, policymakers may learn how to utilize them more effectively.
Economic sanctions, then, can take any of several forms, and
promote any or all of various possible policy objectives. As will be
shown below, the present enforcement regime of anti-bribery legislation
in the United States and elsewhere demonstrates that this legislation
can, and should, be understood as de facto sanctions.
B. The Effect of Anti-Bribery Enforcement: Economic
Withdrawal from Countries Where Bribery is Perceived
to be More Prevalent
In 1995, not quite twenty years after enactment of the FCPA and
three years prior to the OECD treaty ratification, James Hines of the
John F. Kennedy School of Government offered the first major
contribution to the theory that anti-bribery legislation deterred
investment in countries where bribery is perceived to be relatively
prevalent.94 Hines analyzed the impact of the FCPA on U.S. investment
by looking at four indicators of U.S. business activity. First was foreign
direct investment.95 Because the threatened penalties of the FCPA raise
the costs of doing business in higher risk countries, Hines reasoned that
one possible impact of the FCPA would be a reduction in such
business.96 The second factor that Hines examined was capital—to—
labor ratios, which could be reduced as a result of the FCPA if firms
conclude that an equally effective alternative to bribing local politicians
would be to hire larger numbers of their constituents.97 Third, Hines
looked at levels of joint-venture activity post-1977.98 The 1981
Comptroller General’s Report to Congress had documented the
concerns raised by the U.S. business community that they could become
liable for the bribes paid by their joint venture partners, and that some
companies had withdrawn from such ventures as a result of the FCPA.99
Hines reasoned that evidence that firms “systematically avoided
participation in joint ventures in corrupt countries after 1977” would
constitute further evidence of the FCPA’s impact.100 Finally, the 1981
Comptroller General report indicated that the airline industry was most
(2000).
94. James R. Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After
1977 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf.
95. Id. at 6. Hines used data from Business International, which has since become part of
the Economist Intelligence Unit.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 11.
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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likely to be impacted negatively by the FCPA because of the unique
prevalence of bribes.101 Thus, Hines concluded that a drop in U.S.
aircraft exports after 1977, when controlling for other variables, was
likely due to the FCPA.102 Although prior studies had suggested that the
FCPA had no measurable impact on foreign investment,103 Hines
moved beyond prior scholarship by distinguishing the impact of the
FCPA from other unrelated factors.104
He found that by each of these measures, U.S. business activity in
corrupt countries showed “unusual declines” after 1977.105 Foreign
direct investment (FDI) grew substantially more rapidly after 1977 in
less-corrupt countries than in more corrupt countries, after controlling
for GDP growth and total FDI.106 Similarly, the median capital–to–labor
ratio for corrupt high-growth countries fell slightly in the years after the
FCPA, whereas it rose in less-corrupt countries.107 With respect to
aircraft exports, while the U.S. share of the world’s exports declined in
the years following the FCPA, it declined much more significantly,
almost four times as much, in corrupt countries relative to less-corrupt
countries.108
Hines noted that while U.S. commercial engagement in corrupt
countries dropped significantly as a result of the FCPA, no evidence
exists to suggest that total foreign business activity in such countries
dropped; rather, other firms that were not constrained by anti-bribery
legislation apparently took the place once occupied by U.S.
companies.109 He noted that the principal effect of the statute was to
divert U.S. investments to less-corrupt countries, and in more-corrupt
countries to effectively “encourag[e] ownership substitution between
[U.S.] and foreign investors.”110
Hines’ analysis of the impact of anti-bribery legislation on investor
countries was limited to the United States for the obvious reason that it
was the only country with such legislation at the time of his study. Once
101. Id. at 19 n.22. Indeed, the report’s survey of 250 firms in the Fortune 1000 noted that
30% of respondents reported a reduction in overseas business as a consequence of the FCPA,
and in the airline and construction industries the figure is more than 50%. Id.
102. Id. at 16–18.
103. See, e.g., Paul J. Beck, Michael W. Maher & Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Impact of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 295, 301
(1991); John L. Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective, 15 J. INT’L
BUS. STUD. 107–11 (1984). For Hines’ critique of the previous methodologies, see Hines, supra
note 94, at 19 n.23.
104. Hines, supra note 94, at 2.
105. Hines, supra note 94, at 1.
106. Hines, supra note 94, at 10.
107. Hines, supra note 94, at 12.
108. Hines, supra note 94, at 17.
109. Hines, supra note 94, at 19–20.
110. Hines, supra note 94, at 20.
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that changed with ratification of the OECD convention, a new data set
became available, and this data was analyzed for similar trends by
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, an M.I.T.-trained economist at the Darla
Moore School of Business at the University of South Carolina. In his
first article on the subject, Cuervo-Cazurra essentially confirmed and
expanded upon Hines’ thesis.111 Cuervo-Cazurra’s study was narrower
than Hines’ in that he focused exclusively on FDI, but broader in that
Cuervo-Cazurra used data on bilateral FDI inflows from 183 home
economies to 106 host economies with varying quantified corruption
levels.112
Cuervo-Cazurra found that the phenomenon of businesses from
countries with anti-bribery legislation investing less in highly corrupt
countries was not limited to the United States. Rather, high levels of
corruption in a host country generally resulted in less FDI from
signatories to the OECD convention.113 The same phenomenon that
Hines identified with respect to the United States thus became more
widespread as a result of the OECD convention. The underside of the
phenomenon that Hines first identified—countries that are not bound by
anti-bribery legislation continue to invest in corrupt countries—was
likewise confirmed by Cuervo-Cazurra. Post-OECD, as signatory
countries invested less in corrupt countries, countries with higher levels
of corruption received relatively more FDI from countries with similarly
higher corruption levels.114 The result of these trends is that as antibribery legislation became more widespread, corrupt countries received
less of their FDI from less-corrupt countries and more of their FDI from
more-corrupt countries.115
Cuervo-Cazurra further expanded this analysis in a follow-up article
published in 2008,116 which had two major conclusions concerning the
impact of anti-bribery legislation on levels of FDI in relatively corrupt
markets. First, he was able to verify and restate the conclusion of his
previous article—that countries that implemented the OECD convention
had become “more sensitive” to corruption and had reduced their FDI in
more-corrupt countries.117 Second, he proposed a modification of
111. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 814. Cuervo-Cazurra further noted that
Hines’ study had become subject to various methodological disputes, as noted in Shang-Jin Wei,
How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000).
Cuervo-Cazurra believed that he had improved upon Hines’ methodology and yet confirmed the
results. See Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808–09. Again, evaluating these
methodologies is not the purpose of this Article.
112. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 811.
113. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 807–08.
114. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808.
115. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808.
116. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15.
117. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15, at 644.
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Hines’ original thesis. He concluded that prior to the OECD convention,
U.S. investors were not in fact investing less in corrupt countries, but
that they began investing less after the ratification of the OECD.118 In
other words, the FCPA standing alone did not induce U.S. investors to
invest less in corrupt countries, but rather the OECD induced both U.S.
and other OECD signatories to invest less.
Whether Cuervo-Cazurra’s methodology is more reliable than
Hines’ in evaluating the impact of the FCPA prior to the OECD
convention is a question beyond the scope of this Article. The relevant
conclusion from these studies is that the latest empirical studies suggest
that anti-bribery legislation has a deterrent effect on investment in
countries where bribery is perceived to be more prevalent. Moreover,
countries that are more tolerant of corruption fill the FDI void. As the
following section will show, the patterns of FCPA enforcement to date
suggest that emerging markets are the countries where investment will
be most deterred as a result of continued enforcement.
C. The FCPA Enforcement Focus on Emerging Markets
To identify the impact of the FCPA on emerging and frontier
markets, I compiled a list of countries in which alleged acts of bribery
formed the basis of either a finding of liability in a civil action, a
conviction in a criminal action, or a settlement of either. Because these
actions are frequently resolved through pleas, deferred prosecution
agreements, or civil settlements,119 one cannot claim that these instances
of alleged bribery are proven. Because the defendant will sometimes
settle without admitting guilt, they cannot even be called admitted
violations.120 Rather, they are allegations of bribery that ultimately
formed the basis of the resolution of a legal action that is unfavorable to
the defendant. For purposes of this analysis, they will be referred to as
“alleged violations.”
Each country in which an alleged violation occurred over this thirtyyear period has been placed in one of the three categories suggested by
the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) typology: 1) developed markets (those
more developed than the emerging markets); 2) emerging markets; and
3) markets that have not yet become sufficiently attractive investment
118. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15, at 645.
119. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 6 (2005); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of
Authority: The Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1–
3 (2006).
120. See FCPA DIGEST, supra note 8, at 11–201, for a breakdown of bribery-related FCPA
cases by criminal action, civil action brought by the DOJ, and civil action brought by the SEC.
Bribery-related charges might ultimately be settled either under the bribery provisions or the
books and records provisions of the FCPA. See id.
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destinations to the international business and finance community to
have made the S&P list of emerging markets (hereinafter “less
developed markets”).121 In total, there were 125 alleged violations—that
is, 125 separate instances in which a defendant (or group of related
defendants) became liable for one or more illicit payments in a
particular country related to a single commercial transaction or a set of
closely related transactions.
Of these 125 instances, it is perhaps predictable that only nine, or 7%
of the total, occurred in developed countries. Of those nine, only five
have occurred since ratification of the OECD convention. Accordingly,
very little FCPA enforcement activity occurs in developed countries.
Outliers on the other end of the spectrum are those violations that
occurred in countries that are not yet far enough along in their
development to be included among the emerging markets. These
amounted to thirty-one, or 25% of the total. Of the thirty-one, nine
occurred in Iraq as part of the United Nations’ oil-for-food program.
The remaining twenty-two instances occurred in eighteen different
countries—in over thirty years of FCPA enforcement, only four such
countries have been host to more than one FCPA violation.
Accordingly, these enforcement actions are predictably diffuse and
sporadic. Combining this group with the few alleged violations that
have occurred in developed countries results in a total of 32%—just less
than one–third of all enforcement actions have occurred in nations
either too developed, or not developed enough, to create a significant
deterrent to investment. However, over two-thirds of all alleged
violations—eighty-five instances, or 68% of the total—have occurred in
emerging markets, as defined today by S&P.
Arguably, the patterns of enforcement in the first and third
categories of markets—developed markets, and less developed
markets—do not raise substantial public policy concerns. Developed
countries, while unquestionably wrestling with public corruption
problems of their own, generally have relatively lower levels of
tolerance of public corruption. The most commonly cited gauge of
public corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which the
non-profit organization Transparency International sponsors. Based on
surveys of various practitioners, the CPI assigns a ranking to 180
countries.122 Using the 2008 rankings,123 the developed countries in
121. The categorizations of various countries, and the number of alleged violations that
occurred in each, are provided in the APPENDIX.
122. For a discussion of the CPI methodology, see Transparency International: The
Global
Coalition
Against
Corruption,
TI
Corruption
Perceptions
Index,
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
123. Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption, TI Corruption
Perceptions Index 2008, available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_ind

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 2

376

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

which FCPA violations have occurred have a mean CPI ranking of
approximately 29 out of 180—they are among the least corrupt
countries in the world. Given the low levels of corruption and of FCPA
violations in these countries, any deterrent effect on future investment is
likely to be minimal.
At the other end of the spectrum are the countries whose levels of
market development remain quite low. These less-developed markets
are countries where there is a sufficiently high degree of volatility and a
low degree of economic development, such that the finance community
does not generally recommend investment. Unsurprisingly, the
countries in this category that have been host to FCPA violations have a
mean CPI ranking of 127 out of 180—among the most corrupt countries
in the world. In contrast to the developed countries, here there is little
investment and much corruption. In sum, these are countries with
limited current prospects for economic growth, with very high levels of
corruption, and with only sporadic foreign investment. Because these
countries have not yet been able to create the conditions for larger-scale
foreign investment, the aggregate economic impact of FCPA
enforcement actions is far less problematic.
However, the frequency of alleged violations in emerging markets,
and the deterrent effect on these countries that will likely result, raises a
major public policy red flag. These are markets where opportunities for
exceptional economic development exist, where the prospects of
overcoming poverty are historically high, and where the developed
world is already investing in substantial and systematic ways. Many of
these countries are in critical stages in their political development, and
moreover, are likely instrumental in the stabilization of their geographic
regions. China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Venezuela are a few
examples of the countries in Standard & Poor’s list of emerging markets
where FCPA violations have already occurred and which have
significant foreign policy implications. Finally, the mean CPI ranking of
these countries is almost exactly the mean of all countries: 89 out of
180. Corruption levels in these countries, while undeniably a cause for
concern, are only average.
In sum, both economically and politically, public policy would seem
to strongly favor the building of economic ties in emerging markets. Yet
these are the very countries in which most alleged violations occur.
D. Putting the Pieces Together: Anti-Bribery Enforcement as De
Facto Sanctions Against Emerging Markets
To what extent does this pattern of enforcement constitute economic
sanctions? Although HSEO do not count the FCPA or the OECD
ices/cpi/2008 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
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convention as sanctions, and lawyers, political scientists, and
economists have not generally treated them as sanctions, the legislation
exhibits almost all of the characteristics of sanctions. They might rightly
be counted as targeted sanctions—sanctions which target business that
is obtained through the bribery of overseas officials. The list of targeted
nations is open-ended, as they often are for targeted sanctions. We have
seen that the markets that are most likely to fall into that open-ended
category, and that raise the most formidable policy questions, are
emerging markets.
More specifically, consider the four elements of HSEO’s
definition—the “deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat
of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations”124—in reverse
order. Foreign direct investment certainly constitutes trade and financial
relations. The levels of FDI that would exist absent the anti-corruption
legislation are the “customary levels” that are withdrawn as a result of
the legislation. Moreover, the threat of heightened FCPA enforcement,
and the anticipation of more aggressive enforcement by OECD
signatories, should now, after the work of Hines and Cuervo-Cazurra,
constitute at least a tacit threat of further withdrawal. Because this
withdrawal results from an act of government, it is “governmentinspired.” They began as unilateral sanctions, but as often occurs, over
time they became multilateral with the ratification of the OECD
convention. These sanctions are not universally enforced, but then
again, sanctions rarely are.
Despite these parallels, it will be shown below that the FCPA fails
quite conspicuously to meet the first of HSEO’s elements: the sanctions
that result from the FCPA are not deliberate. That is, the United States
did not intend to punish target countries by withdrawing customary
trade and financial relations, either when it passed the FCPA or later
when amending it. The FCPA thus resembles sanctions in every respect
except, arguably, the most important one: no politically accountable
governmental body ever decided to impose them. Part I of this Article
explained that the statute, on its face, punishes suppliers of bribes only.
The following exploration of the legislative history shows that this was
precisely the purpose of the statute. It demonstrates that the FCPA was
not to any meaningful degree an expression of disapproval of the
governments that tolerate bribery. More to the point, the congressional
testimony, like the statute, does not reflect an intent to punish those
governments by withdrawing customary trade and financial relations. In
this respect, and perhaps only in this respect, the consequences of FCPA
enforcement are materially different from the targeted sanctions that
have become so common in the post-Cold War era.
124. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: BUILDING ALLIANCES THROUGH
ETHICAL INVESTMENT
Given the FCPA’s straight-forward moral appeal and the context of
the infamous Watergate scandal, the statute can lend itself to fairly
simple assumptions about the values that motivated its passage. Relying
on a general knowledge of the times and the structure and operation of
the statute today, one can arrive at a number of incorrect conclusions
about the zeitgeist of the time: that everyone believed in a universal
ethical norm by which bribery was offensive; that immediate legislation
was appropriate; that the legislation would ideally be multilateral, but if
impossible, unilateral legislation was nonetheless called for; that the
legislation should criminalize bribery; and that any negative impact to
U.S. competitiveness would be easily outweighed by the moral and
economic benefits of reducing bribery.
The prevalence of this way of thinking is due in part to the failure of
legal scholars thus far to more deeply mine the legislative history. This
history reveals that among businessmen, financiers, academics,
congressmen, presidential appointees, and U.S. Presidents, there was
substantial disagreement on numerous fundamental issues, including:
whether bribery was common overseas; whether bribery was necessary
to conduct business there; whether companies from countries other than
the United States engaged in bribery; whether the United States should
work toward an international consensus and a multilateral treaty
prohibiting bribery, or instead pass unilateral legislation; if the latter,
whether it would impose a competitive disadvantage on U.S.
businesses, have no impact, or actually improve their competitiveness;
and whether any such legislation should criminalize bribery or merely
impose civil penalties. The debate was surprisingly heated and
contentious, peppered with dramatic rhetorical flourishes and poignant
metaphors.
The context of this debate creates a colorful backdrop, against which
the underlying unanimity becomes all the more striking. On the more
fundamental question of the legislation’s purpose and its intended
effects, every individual who testified clearly believed that the FCPA
should encourage investment in higher risk countries to build economic
and political alliances. The legislation would be an alliance-building
tool. No one ever suggested, either in 1977 or in 1998, that the FCPA
should punish countries that tolerate bribery by withdrawing economic
support. Indeed, it should do precisely the opposite. Part IV.A paints the
backdrop by sampling the more divided testimony. Against that
backdrop, Part IV.B shows the breath of the consensus on the
fundamental purpose of the legislation. Part IV.C further shows that in
ratifying the OECD Convention and amending the FCPA in 1998, the
United States continued to believe that the legislation should promote,
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rather than deter, investment in countries that have historically
presented higher bribery risks.
A. The Early Disputes Over The Scope of the Problem and the
Appropriate Remedy
The earliest and most fundamental issue before Congress obviously
was the magnitude of the overseas bribery problem—just how prevalent
is bribery overseas, and how widely are U.S. businesses participating in
it? This proved to be a topic of considerable disagreement. Many
witnesses and documents admitted into the record suggested that the
practice was nearly universal. In the course of the earliest hearings on
the need for international anti-bribery legislation, Lockheed represented
that bribes to overseas officials for business purposes had been made in
“some countries . . . for centuries—and was a practice we believe was
engaged in by a great many companies, both American and foreign,
including Lockheed.”125 Its testimony went on to mention numerous
other indicators that overseas bribery was widely practiced by
businesses from many countries, and that it was known to exist by U.S.
officials in both business and government.126
At least some of the media painted a similar picture. The prevalence
of such payments was captured in a survey of Washington Post foreign
correspondents published on June 22, 1975. Admitted into the
congressional testimony, the survey reported that such payments “are
ubiquitous and a way of life in many countries” and are “part of a
deeply rooted system of doing business.”127 Similarly, an interview by
the Financial Times of the chairman of the U.S. Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce suggested there are countries
where, no matter the company’s size, “you could not do business
without greasing someone’s palm.”128
Two U.S. Senators, in the course of the congressional hearings,
powerfully voiced a similar perception of the prevalence of bribery in
international business. Senator Abraham Ribicoff, a Democrat from
Connecticut, stated:
What disturbed me as I traveled around the world was the
realization that American business was being
internationally blamed for activities which are very obvious
to me were a very common practice throughout the entire
world. Not only the countries of the West—Western
Europe, Japan, and the United States—but certainly
125.
126.
127.
128.

1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 26.
1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 27.
1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 26, 57–60.
1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 50–51.
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through Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.129
Similarly, Senator Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho,
concluded: “There is no doubt that these practices are common, and that
they are used by foreign and American firms alike.”130 This perception
was further articulated by members of the administration of President
Gerald Ford. Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, noted: “We
are told that businessmen from other countries take the view that what
we call improper payments are a basic requirement of the societies in
which they operate, and represent centuries old practices which no
amount of indignation or legislation can change.”131
This view of the role of bribery in international business was
expressed perhaps most poignantly in a September 21, 1976, article in
Foreign Affairs, which had been admitted into the record, in which the
author tellingly explained: “The legend persists that the Harvard
Business School student who questioned the ethics of this practice was
directed by his professor to enroll in the Harvard Divinity School.”132
A very different perspective was articulated once President Jimmy
Carter took office. The most forceful voice was that of George Ball,
then of Lehman Bros., but formerly Undersecretary of State under
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Ball, who had become most famous
for his opposition to the escalation of the Vietnam War, struck a far
more moralistic tone. In response to American businessmen suggesting
that bribery is pervasive and necessary, he said, “[s]uch self-righteous
answers cannot stand analysis. That American business firms are
compelled to engage in bribery is disproved by the example of a number
of our most successful enterprises that rigorously reject such practices
yet still do enormous business all over the world.”133
According to this worldview, the problem is not the absence of
appropriate ethical standards abroad, but rather, of low standards in the
United States. Dr. Gordon Adams, Director of the Military Research
Council on Economic Priorities, a public interest research organization,
129. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad: Hearing Before the.
Subcomm. on International Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter
1975 Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff).
130. Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Frank Church).
131. Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong. 153 (1976) [hereinafter
1976 Joint Priorities Hearing].
132. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 126
(1976) [hereinafter 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing].
133. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 39 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking Hearings]
(statement of George Ball, Lehman Bros).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/2

30

Spalding: Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Ec

2010]

ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION

381

observed that “the problem may not be one of lower standards abroad,
but of low standards in general for U.S. corporate behavior.”134 In a
sharper retort to the previous testimony, he stated, “If anyone thinks that
these standards are vastly different in other countries than they are in
the United States, then that person must indeed be naïve.”135
Relatedly, there was substantial disagreement on whether the United
States should act unilaterally in prohibiting overseas bribery, or instead,
seek to build an international agreement that would result in multilateral
legislation. For example, Treasury Secretary Simon favored an
international agreement with the United Nations (UN), International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and OECD,136 and was concerned that unilateral
action by the United States might “undercut the vital principle that
cooperative action by the whole international community of nations is
needed in order to deal effectively with this problem.”137 Likewise, Ian
MacGregor, Chairman of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber
of Commerce, testified that given the prevalence of bribery, “an
international agreement on the legal definition for bribery and
corruption might be needed before any general law and penalties could
be drawn up to stop the practices,” and urged the committee to delay
unilateral legislation until the problem could be further studied and a
more effective and fair remedy supplied.138
By contrast, Representative Stephen J. Solarz, a Democrat from New
York and a member of the House International Relations Committee,
believed that “any truly effective international agreement which
provided enforcement procedures and sanctions would be a long time
coming—if ever . . . . To wait until bribery is solved on a multilateral
basis may well be to wait forever.”139
The concern about unilateral action was based largely on the feared
impact of such action on the competitiveness of U.S. businesses. Robert
S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, stated, “It is tempting to try to
deal with the situation unilaterally, but there are serious risks for the
United States in such an approach. There is widespread recognition in
134. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 35
(statement of Dr. Gordon Adams, Director of the Military Research Council on Economic
Priorities).
135. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 35
(quoting Conference Board, an independent research organization, from The New York Times,
Feb. 13, 1976).
136. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 86 (statement of William E. Simon,
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury).
137. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 88.
138. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 51–52 (statement of Ian
MacGregor, Chairman of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce).
139. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 142
(statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz).
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the Congress that such unilateral action would put U.S. companies at a
serious disadvantage in the export trade.”140 This fear was shared by the
International Chamber of Commerce, which testified that unless
prohibitions on overseas bribery were internationalized, it “could, and in
some cases would, mitigate severely against U.S. business and prevent
it from being able to compete effectively in quite substantial markets of
the world.”141 Senator Ribicoff predicted that under unilateral
legislation, “the American companies, who should be making payoffs
then would be barred from making payoffs, the business that they
should be getting would be going to foreign competitors who were
undertaking the same practices.”142
Then-Senator Joe Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, also agreed
that frequently in international business, not just in the Lockheed
instance but in many others, U.S. firms are competing only against
fellow U.S. firms.143 W. Michael Blumenthal, Treasury Secretary under
President Carter, testified that paying bribes, “apart from being morally
repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not necessary for the
successful conduct of business here or overseas. I believe that the
responsible elements of the business community agree.”144 George Ball
concurred, testifying that frequently, as in the case of Lockheed, the
U.S. company is only competing against other U.S. companies.145 He
concluded:
The only action that could materially reduce the practice—
and mitigate its consequences—is for the U.S. Government
to utilize its powers as the domiciliary state of most of the
largest multinational companies by enacting and enforcing
comprehensive laws imposing on American corporations a
standard of conduct in their overseas dealings fully as strict
as that required at home. Only when that is done will our
Government be able to speak with authority in shaping an
international set of rules and sanctions. Having put our own
house in order, we will be entitled to insist that foreign
140. 1976 Joint Priorities Hearing, supra note 131, at 154 (statement of Hon. Robert S.
Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State).
141. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 49 (statement of Ian MacGregor,
Chairman of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce).
142. 1975 Senate Hearing, supra note 129, at 1 (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff).
143. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 44–45 (statement of Sen. Joseph R.
Biden, Junior).
144. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 67 (1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Senate Banking Hearing] (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury).
145. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 39 (statement of George Ball,
Lehman Bros.).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/2

32

Spalding: Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Ec

2010]

ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION

383

governments do likewise—and, in time, this procedure
should gradually bring some solid results.146
Some, even of the business community, testified that anti-bribery
legislation would actually improve the ability of U.S. companies to
conduct business overseas. The Chairman of Gulf Oil Corporation
urged Congress,
[Y]ou can help us, and many other multinational
corporations which are confronted by this problem by
enacting legislation which would outlaw any foreign
contribution by an American company. Such a statute on
our books would make it easier to resist the very intense
pressures which are placed upon us from time to time.147
Ultimately, both the House and Senate committee reports echoed this
opinion.148 Similarly, the SEC interpreted its data to suggest that the
cessation of such foreign payments “will not seriously affect the ability
of American business to compete in world markets.”149
As with the question of whether bribery is prevalent internationally,
there was some doubt as to whether any U.S. law should go so far as to
criminalize such bribery, which the FCPA of course ultimately did. The
Ford Administration was concerned that criminalization was both too
severe and too difficult to implement. In President Ford’s August 3,
1976 Message from the President of the United States Urging
Enactment of Proposed Legislation to Require the Disclosure of
Payments to Foreign Officials, he urged passage of a bill that required
reporting but did not criminalize payments, due to problems of
“definition and proof.”150
These competing worldviews, and the tensions among different
witnesses and administrations, were illustrated in the following
exchange. Frustrated by what he regarded as a tentative approach when
146. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 40–41.
147. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141–42
(statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz) (quoting Bob R. Dorsey, Chairman of Gulf Oil Corp.).
148. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (“Many U.S. firms have taken a strong stand
against paying foreign bribes and are still able to compete in international trade.”); H.R. REP.
NO. 95-640, at 5 (1977) (citing the testimony of SEC Chairman Roderick Hills that bribery is
“unnecessary”).
149. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REPORT
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 42–43 (Comm. Print 1976).
150. FOREIGN PAYMENT DISCLOSURE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES URGING ENACTMENT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE OF
PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-572, at 1 (1976) [hereinafter 1976
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT].
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he felt that an immediate and fairly strong response was needed, Senator
Proxmire said,
I recall the story of an agency in the bureaucracy that was
short on bureaucrats. They hired a talking parrot. And they
made him a GS–15. They taught him to say only one
phrase: ‘Very complex, very complex.’ Sometimes I get the
feeling that that parrot, that very complex parrot, is in
charge of the Federal Government’s groping, grasping,
policy on bribery.151
Elliot L. Richardson, President Ford’s Secretary of Commerce,
responded that the Ford Administration was developing numerous noncriminalizing solutions, including information-sharing agreements,
disclosure requirements, a code of conduct, and developing an
international approach through the OECD and the UN.152 Expressing
reservations about criminalization, Richardson said, “Even a parrot
must occasionally be right.”153 Following Richardson, Ford’s Treasury
Secretary William E. Simon began his testimony, “The Treasury
Department actually hired a second parrot, Mr. Chairman and he says, ‘I
agree, let’s study it.’”154
B. The Early Consensus: Anti-Bribery Legislation as an
Alliance-Building Instrument
There was one issue which no one apparently believed needed to be
studied. Despite these contrasting viewpoints on crucial issues related to
the nature of the problem and the appropriate remedy, an absolute
consensus existed on the question of the purpose and intended effects of
the proposed legislation. Bribery is a foreign policy problem because it
jeopardizes our relations with countries whose alliances we very much
value. Specifically, exposing the bribing of overseas officials
undermines U.S. credibility and creates the conditions in which hostile
governments can spread. Moreover, all agreed that these alliances must
be maintained through the continued building of economic and political
ties with vulnerable countries, and that the resulting legislation was
therefore designed to promote investment in countries where bribery
was occurring, rather than to withdraw investments as punishment. The
legislative history reveals that this view was shared by the business
151. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 76 (statement of Sen. William
Proxmire).
152. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 79 (statement of Elliot Richardson,
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce).
153. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 80.
154. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 84 (statement of William E. Simon,
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury).
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community as well as by every member of Congress who spoke. The bipartisan nature of this consensus is further apparent in the comments
made by members of the Republican Ford Administration and the
Democratic Carter Administration, whose comments were
indistinguishable both in substance and tone.
The most fulsome explanation of the foreign policy implications of
international bribery was provided by Congressman Solarz. He began
his testimony: “It is important to look at the problem of overseas
payments in broader terms than simply a matter of economics or even
morality.”155 In doing so, Solarz articulated a view that would prove to
be universal among witnesses that there existed another dimension to
the problem of overseas bribery, and he used the example of Lockheed
to illustrate this view. Solarz described that the Lockheed scandal,
which involved payments to Japanese officials, put “‘[t]he democratic
system in Japan [] in grave danger.’”156 Japanese opponents of the close
ties between the United States and Japan were
handed a terribly effective weapon to drive a wedge
between two close allies. At a time of uncertainty due to the
shifting balances of power in Asia, our strongest and most
stable ally in the region [was] undergoing unnecessary
turbulence, and [a] relationship which is at the very heart of
our foreign policy [was] potentially jeopardized.157
Lockheed’s payments had also occurred in the Netherlands, where
Prince Bernhard reportedly received $1.1 million in bribes from
Lockheed and was forced to resign. But, Solarz explained, “[p]erhaps
most serious” was the “delicate situation” with Italy, which was “one of
the keys to the southern flank of NATO.”158 He explained that the
power struggle between Italy’s more democratic party—the Christian
Democrats—and the Communist Party was at that time quite
pronounced, and the balance was precarious. He noted that
“[a]llegations of payments by Lockheed served to advance the
Communist cause in Italy where the Communist bloc was strengthened
by the sight of corrupt capitalism.”159 His ultimate fear was that the
155. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 140
(statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz).
156. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 172 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Protection Hearings] (statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz)
(quoting “a very senior politician close to former [Japanese] Prime Minister Takeo Mike”).
157. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141
(statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz).
158. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141.
159. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen S.
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Communist Party would gain a majority in the Italian parliament and
the country would be lost to the enemy.160
He concluded that the foreign policy implications for the United
States were “staggering and in some cases, perhaps irreversible.”161 U.S.
foreign policy objectives are “seriously impaired” when “foreign
government is weakened by corruption because popular support erodes
thus jeopardizing common interests shared with our friends
overseas.”162 The example of Italy demonstrated that “[c]ommunist and
other anti-U.S. forces are quick to take advantage of any evidence of
immorality or corruption associated with pro-Western governments.
Both fear and resentment are generated among foreign officials who
become increasingly hostile as the United States continues to expose
traditional corrupt practices abroad.”163 He continued, “The resulting
economic and political instability is certainly detrimental to American
foreign policy especially when it results in a backlash against American
ideals and interests.”164 Ultimately, he observed, “[W]hat is at stake is
much more than the individual interests of corporations which are
competing for a share of foreign markets. What is in fact at stake is the
foreign policy and national interest of the Untied [sic] States.”165
This view would be powerfully expressed by members of both the
Ford and Carter Administrations. Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal
Adviser in the Department of State under President Ford, testified that
[c]orruption weakens the fabric of government, erodes
popular support, and jeopardizes the important interests we
share with our friends abroad. The free enterprise system is
a vital factor in world economic growth upon which social
progress, economic justice, and perhaps, ultimately, world
peace depends. . . . Corruption of friendly foreign
governments can undermine the most important objectives
of our foreign policy.166

Solarz).
160. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141
(statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz).
161. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 2
(statement of John M. Murphy, Chairman).
162. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen S.
Solarz).
163. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173.
164. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173.
165. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173.
166. The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong. 23–24 (1975) (statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State).
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Similarly, Ford’s Deputy Secretary of State, Robert S. Ingersoll,
stated:
I wish to state for the record that grievous damage has been
done to the foreign relations of the United States by recent
disclosures . . . . [I]t is a fact that public discussion in this
country of the alleged misdeeds of officials of foreign
governments cannot fail to damage our relations with these
governments.167
Treasury Secretary William E. Simon further stated that it “erodes
the general reputation of the American business community, may
adversely affect our relations with foreign governments and can
contribute to a general deterioration in the climate for fair and open
international trade and investment.”168 It is notable that this concern was
voiced by members of both parties. Indeed, it was voiced by both
presidential administrations. Ford’s Commerce Secretary, Elliot L.
Richardson, further articulated: “Bribery corrodes the confidence that
must exist between buyer and seller if domestic and international
commerce is to flourish. It threatens to poison relationships between the
United States and nations with which we have long had mutually
beneficial political and commercial ties.”169
In urging passage of legislation, President Ford stated that reports of
bribery “have resulted in an erosion of confidence in the responsibility
of many of our important business enterprises. In a more general way,
these disclosures tend to destroy confidence in our free enterprise
institutions.”170 He repeated the theme that bribery is first and foremost
a problem of image and creates a crisis of confidence, rather than a
problem of substantive ethics or economic efficiency and growth.171
The legislation would “contribute in an important way to the restoration
of confidence in America’s vital business institutions.”172
Unlike their arguments on other issues, which marked a sharp
departure from the prior administration, the comments coming from the
Carter Administration were indistinguishable from those of its
predecessor. Carter’s Treasury Secretary, W. Michael Blumenthal,
stated, “The Carter Administration believes that it is damaging both to
our country and to a healthy world economic system for American
167. 1976 Joint Priorities Hearing, supra note 131, at 154 (statement of Hon. Robert S.
Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of State).
168. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 85 (statement of William E. Simon,
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury).
169. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 76.
170. 1976 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT, supra note 150, at 1.
171. 1976 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT, supra note 150, at 3.
172. 1976 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT, supra note 150, at 3.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 2

388

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

corporations to bribe foreign officials.”173 President Carter ultimately
explained in his signing statement that
[d]uring my campaign for the Presidency, I repeatedly
stressed the need for tough legislation to prohibit corporate
bribery. [The FCPA] provides that necessary sanction. I
share Congress belief that bribery is ethically repugnant
and competitively unnecessary. Corrupt practices between
corporations and public officials overseas undermine the
integrity and stability of governments and harm our
relations with other countries. Recent revelations of
widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence
in our basic institutions.174
Again, this view was expressed most forcefully and eloquently by
the Democrat George Ball:
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising
copy and propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free
enterprise are cancelled every night when managements
demonstrate by their conduct that a sector of multinational
business activity is not free; it is bought and paid for. This
is a problem that, like so many others, has relevance in the
struggle of antagonistic ideologies; for, when our
enterprises stoop to bribery and kickbacks, they give
substance to the communist myth—already widely believed
in Third World countries—that capitalism is fundamentally
corrupt.175
Thus, even most liberal, reform-minded advocates recognized
the urgent foreign policy implications.
The congressional reports captured this important basis for the
legislation. The Senate Report stated that as “[t]he image of American
democracy abroad has been tarnished . . . [c]onfidence in the financial
integrity of our corporations has been impaired.”176 Governments that
otherwise had friendly relations with the United States, such as Japan,
Italy, and the Netherlands, came under “intense pressure from their own
people.”177 The idea gained its most fulsome expression in the House
173. 1977 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 144, at 67 (statement of W. Michael
Blumenthal, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury).
174. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement on Signing S.
305 into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1909, 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977).
175. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 41–42 (statement of George Ball,
Lehman Bros.).
176. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977).
177. Id.
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Report, which discussed the ethical component of the bribery
problem,178 and that bribery is not only unethical, but is “bad business
as well.”179 It mentioned that bribery “short-circuits the marketplace” by
channeling business to companies that are “too inefficient” or “too lazy”
to compete fairly.180 Bribery “rewards corruption instead of efficiency
and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards.”181
Despite these themes of ethics and efficiency, the overriding concern
expressed in the House Report was with America’s international
image— “It erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market
system.”182 And the corrupt practices of some U.S. companies “casts a
shadow on all U.S. companies.”183 It also noted that “the exposure of
such activity can damage a company’s image,” while secondarily
mentioning that it can cause direct financial damage.184
The House Report further sounded the theme of the foreign policy
implications of overseas bribery. Bribery creates “severe foreign policy
problems” for the United States.185 The Lockheed scandal, for instance,
“shook the Government of Japan to its political foundation and gave
opponents of close ties between the United States and Japan an effective
weapon with which to drive a wedge between the two nations.”186
Similarly, when it was revealed that multiple large oil companies bribed
Italian officials, it “eroded public support for that Government and
jeopardized U.S. foreign policy” with Italy, the broader Mediterranean
area, and “with respect to the entire NATO alliance.”187 Ultimately,
bribery can “embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem for the
United States among the citizens of foreign nations, and lend credence
to the suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United States that
American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the political
processes of their nations.”188 These comments, again, assume that
bribery is incongruent with the cultural norms of the payee’s country,
and that its exposure sparks public outrage.
The foreign policy implications of bribery were perhaps stated most
graphically, and somewhat comically, in the following exchange. The
executive of a company that was known to have bribed overseas
officials in a European country testified, somewhat incredibly, that
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

H. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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although his company had in fact paid bribes to leaders of Eastern
European countries, the purpose of its work was to promote liberal free
enterprise and stave off communism, which required bribing political
parties.189 Then-Senator Joe Biden, sitting on the committee, facetiously
asked, “How much did you contribute to the Communist Party?”
Perhaps not appreciating the Senator’s tone, the attorney turned to the
president of the corporation, conferred for a moment, and replied,
“Well, $88,000.”190
The foreign policy implications of bribery were unmistakable. But
also unmistakable was the precise design of the intended remedy:
continued investment, albeit subject to higher ethical standards. In the
ensuing twenty years, the United States would realize that the FCPA
was in fact restricting such investment by U.S. companies, and that this
constituted a serious shortfall of the legislation. In 1998, Congress
would undertake to correct that problem and create the conditions under
which U.S. businesses would again be free to invest liberally in
transitional economies.
C. Affirming the Consensus in Amending the FCPA Twenty Years
Later
As explained in Part II, although the FCPA was amended in 1988 in
several respects, this occurred as part of an omnibus bill, with minimal
congressional testimony on the nature and purpose of anti-bribery
legislation. Despite the legislative vehicle for these amendments, the
1988 Amendments would prove most significant in their requirement
that the President pursue the negotiation of an international agreement
with the member countries of the OECD to govern acts prohibited by
the FCPA.191
This requirement was ultimately satisfied on December 17, 1997,
with the OECD Member States’ adoption of the Convention on
Combating Bribery.192 The convention required each state to adopt its
own legislation to enact its provisions into law and provide for its
enforcement,193 and the United States did so on December 8, 1998.
While the convention does not require absolute identity among the
statutes passed by the various states, it does require functional

189. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 45 (statement of Sen. Joseph R.
Biden, Junior).
190. Id.
191. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, 924 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1957.
192. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
193. Id.
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equivalence,194 and this in turn required amendments to the FCPA.
The U.S. ratification of the convention began with the May 4, 1998
message from President Clinton transmitting the OECD convention.
The message referenced only a single policy behind ratifying the treaty:
Since the enactment . . . of [the FCPA], the United States
has been alone in specifically criminalizing the businessrelated bribery of foreign public officials. United States
corporations have contended that this has put them at a
significant disadvantage in competing for international
contracts with respect to foreign competitors who are not
subject to such laws.195
The President advocated ratification of the treaty because it would
facilitate U.S. investment in countries where the FCPA had previously
put U.S. businesses at a disadvantage.
The theme would prove fundamental in the ensuing congressional
testimony, and was frequently captured with the same ubiquitous
metaphor. In the hearings before the House Commerce Committee’s
Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials, Congressman
Michael Oxley, a Republican from Ohio, stated that the convention
would “go a long way to leveling the playing field.”196 Congressman
Bliley reiterated the theme of fighting bribery by “level[ing] the playing
field,”197 as would Associate Director of Enforcement for the S.E.C.
Paul V. Gerlach.198 The metaphor eventually made its way into the
presidential signing statement, wherein President Clinton explained that
“U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven playing field,
resulting in losses of international contracts estimated at $30 billion per
year.”199
The overwhelming concern among congressional leaders and
witnesses, as well as the President, in ratifying the OECD treaty was
enabling U.S. businesses to compete with companies from countries that
had not previously ratified or enforced anti-bribery legislation. The
predictions of some in the original hearings that the FCPA would not
adversely affect U.S. competitiveness had, by all accounts, proven
194. See ZARIN, supra note 18, at § 13:3.
195. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, at III (1998).
196. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 1
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 House Finance Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley).
197. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley).
198. Id. at 11 (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director of Enforcement of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission).
199. Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2290, 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998), reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. 771, 771 [hereinafter 1998 Presidential Signing Statement].
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wrong, and the inability of U.S. companies to continue investing in
historically higher risk countries had become a major public policy
concern. This theme proved so dominant that many of the other issues
that had appeared in the testimony in the 1970s had, by 1998,
disappeared. Among the vanished themes was the damage that bribery
did to U.S. foreign policy interests. This disappearance was likely due
largely to two factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought
an end to bi-polar international politics, and the success of the FCPA in
curbing bribery, which at least in part brought an end to the major
overseas bribery scandals such as Lockheed’s.
But despite the absence of overt foreign policy themes in the 1998
testimony, from the concept of leveling the playing field there generally
emerged three more subtle, but unmistakably present, themes that bear
on the question of the FCPA’s intended effect on international relations.
Each is consistent with the 1977 view of the FCPA.
First and perhaps most obviously, it remained true that the
legislation would, and should, target only the suppliers of the bribes,
and not the solicitors, recipients, or the governments that tolerate them.
Congressman Edward J. Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts,
submitted a prepared opening statement which explained that in
originally passing the FCPA, “it was hoped that by taking the lead to
curb bribery by our corporations, America would put pressure on the
other developed industrialized nations to adopt similar laws.”200
Congressman Oxley testified that the problem which the OECD
convention was designed to remedy “is that our competitors have much
looser rules and enforcement mechanisms against bribery.”201
Congressman Thomas Manton, Democrat from New York, expressed
the problem was not merely with the absence of fear of penalty, as
certain trading partners, such as Germany, apparently “appear to
actually encourage [bribery] through their tax codes.”202 The House
Report ultimately noted that since 1977, U.S. businesses have “operated
at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who have continued to
pay bribes without fear of penalty.”203 The report stated that the OECD
treaty will, in relation to the FCPA, achieve “comparable prohibitions in
other developed countries.”204 The object of the legislation, then as
before, was to punish the supply of bribes, and not the demand. The
200. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 5 (statement of Rep. Edward J.
Markey).
201. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 1 (statement of Rep. Michael G.
Oxley).
202. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 3 (statement of Rep. Thomas J.
Manton).
203. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10 (1998).
204. Id.
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convention was going after bribery suppliers in developed markets, and
not solicitors, recipients, or the governments of emerging markets.
Second, and nearly as obvious, in “leveling the playing field,” the
objective was to encourage U.S. investment in those markets where the
FCPA had served to inhibit it. Undersecretary of State Stuart Eisenstat
testified that lost business to the United States, as a result of the FCPA,
was approximately $30 billion per year,205 and that the OECD would
have covered about 70% of those deals.206 His concern was that the
United States was being denied investment opportunities because of this
legislation. Congressman Oxley explained that the OECD would again
enable that investment:
American business and American workers, the most
productive in the world, are prime beneficiaries of free and
open markets overseas. But to take advantage of the
benefits of free trade, the business victory has to go to the
best competitor. . . . Transparency and openness are keys to
free competition. The more fair the competitive
environment, the better our companies will do.207
The inability of U.S. businesses to invest in historically higher risk
countries was precisely the problem which the 1988 amendments had
directed the President to remedy, and which were in fact remedied by
the adoption of the convention.
Third, the theme of how to effectively bring about host-country
reforms appears in the testimony in ways that, albeit still faint, are
unmistakably present. The few who hinted at the mechanism by which
the OECD would effect these reforms suggested, although admittedly
not overwhelmingly, that it should be heightened investment, not
withdrawal. Two congressmen alluded to the possibilities of reform.
Congressman Manton explained that bribery’s “detrimental effect on
economies and societies is evident. Corruption distorts the allocation of
resources, undermines fair competition in the marketplace, hurts
economic development, erodes confidence in political systems and
fosters organized crime.”208 Drawing on recent economic events,
Congressman Oxley explained that U.S. investment in developing
countries is

205. H.R. REP. NO. 43, at 45 (1998) (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Undersecretary of the
U.S. Department of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
206. Id. at 61.
207. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. Michael G.
Oxley).
208. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 3 (statement of Rep. Thomas J.
Manton).
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better for the countries involved. Recent events in Asia
show us that a lack of transparency can lead to market
distortions and inefficiencies with negative results for
national economies and individual citizens. This
Convention will not end bribery worldwide, and I think we
all understand that, but it is an important step forward in
America’s effort to lead the world to a more open, marketbased system.209
Congressman Oxley thus suggested, albeit in passing, that reforms in
higher risk countries were perhaps one eventual result of the legislation,
and that such reforms would occur as a result of investment rather than
withdrawal. Similarly, the House Commerce Committee Report stated
that the goal of the United States in ratifying the OECD was to promote
“stronger, more reliable, and transparent foreign legal regimes that, in
turn, make for more reliable and attractive investment climates.”210 The
House Report characterizes the harm that comes to payee countries in
terms of economic efficiency, rather than ethics, and as two-fold. First,
the quality of the products and services to be provided by the payor
diminishes, in that countries that receive bribes may grant contracts to
businesses “offering an inferior deal.”211 Second, it suggests that the
perception that bribery is necessary in a country to do business in effect
deters investment, in that “countries that have the most corruption have
trouble attracting foreign investment because the need to bribe acts as a
substantial added tax on the investor.”212 While none of these comments
expressly reference the intended mechanism of effecting reforms—
whether it should be investment or withdrawal—both Congressmen
Oxley and Manton, as well as the House Report, had already amply
expressed their intention that the statute should promote investment.
The theme would become slightly more apparent in the testimony of
the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, Andrew Pincus.
He testified that
Implementation of this treaty around the world is absolutely
vital to the promotion of our democratic ideals. Corruption
is completely inconsistent with free trade and fair
government, and implementation of this treaty is also vital
to the ability of American companies to compete in the
global economy. The unfortunate reality is that last year we
estimate $30 billion in international contracts were alleged
209.
Oxley).
210.
211.
212.

1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 2 (statement of Rep. Michael G.
H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10 (1998).
Id.
Id.
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to involve bribery by foreign firms.213
Pincus did not seem to imagine that further losses to investors of the
developed world would be the impetus to reform. Rather, in remedying
the problem of lost U.S. business opportunities, both the United States
and the OECD signatories would take advantage of those opportunities
through continued investment, and that reforms would occur as a result.
Similarly, President Clinton’s signing statement provided, “The
United States has led the effort to curb international bribery. We have
long believed bribery is inconsistent with democratic values, such as
good governance and the rule of law. It is also contrary to basic
principles of fair competition and harmful to efforts to promote
economic development.”214 Although communism was no longer the
enemy, it was nonetheless envisioned that liberal reforms could, over
time, occur if the developed world prohibited bribery and yet continued
to actively invest in countries that were historically higher–risk. Thus,
host-country reform was clearly secondary in importance in 1998,
subsumed under the imperative of promoting U.S. investment. But to
the extent that it was addressed, all parties suggested that greater
transparency, productivity, and efficiency could be obtained by
encouraging investment in countries where the U.S. businesses had been
hamstrung by the FCPA in relation to companies from other countries.
No one suggested that withdrawal was intended, foreseeable, or
effective. Therefore, the purpose of leveling the playing field, then, was
to get the United States back in the game.
And the game, it might be said, was to actively and competitively
invest in those countries that presented substantial economic
opportunities, but where bribery remained enough of a problem that
countries not previously bound by anti-bribery legislation had competed
with an advantage over U.S. companies. Generally speaking, these
would be the emerging markets. The goal of the 1998 amendments was
thus to enable U.S. investment in such markets.
If economic withdrawal were the objective, anti-competitiveness
would not be a concern—policymakers would expressly intend that U.S.
businesses continue to not invest in higher risk countries, regardless of
what other developed-country competitors might be doing. But this was
never suggested. The unmistakable intention was to promote continued
investment in countries where bribery occurred. Neither was it ever
suggested that countries that tolerate bribery should be held responsible
for the prevalence of bribery and punished through economic
withdrawal. To the contrary, the general view was that reforms might
213. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 6 (statement of Andrew J. Pincus,
General Counsel to the U.S. Department of Commerce).
214. 1998 Presidential Signing Statement, supra note 199, at 2290.
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incrementally occur through continued investment by companies from
less corrupt countries. No one, not a single witness, suggested that it
would be appropriate, let alone effective, to withdraw economic support
from countries that neglected to crack down on bribery. The concept is
simply not present in the legislative history, just as it is not manifest in
the statutory text. Rather, the purpose was to underscore that antibribery legislation resembles economic sanctions in every respect
except arguably the most important one, as there is no congressional
testimony showing that anyone ever intended it to function this way.
The FCPA, and its progeny, thus constitute a unique kind of economic
sanction: they sanction host countries despite the intentions of anyone
who ever testified on the matter.
V. THE CONUNDRUM OF UNWITTING SANCTIONS
Given this legislative history, the FCPA is disqualified from one of
the two recognized purposes of sanctions. It cannot be thought of, even
with a caveat, as expressive sanctions, for the obvious reason that the
United States never expressed a desire to impose them. They are, then,
unwitting sanctions; de facto, and not de jure. To the extent that the
withdrawal of these customary trade and financial relations has any
value at all, it must be of instrumental value—the capacity to effect
reforms in target countries. However, thinking of anti-bribery
legislation as unwitting instrumental sanctions against emerging
markets proves deeply problematic. Specifically, it presents two distinct
sets of problems: the first concerns the actual effects of the legislation’s
enforcement, and the second concerns whether those effects are
justifiable as a matter of public policy.
A. The Likely Effects of the Present Enforcement Regime
If current enforcement trends continue, any of three aggregate
outcomes might result, none of which is satisfactory. The first is that
targeted countries will respond to the economic withdrawal by
implementing domestic reforms. While this might be the most desirable
outcome, it is certainly not the most likely. Indeed, economic sanctions
literature casts substantial doubt on whether this can ever be a realistic
foreign policy goal: it is at best uncertain whether these sanctions can
succeed in effecting reforms in emerging markets. As explained above,
economists and political scientists have demonstrated that whether
sanctions are likely to prove effective is a complex analysis. Among the
political goals that bear the most relevance to anti-corruption legislation
include the extent of international cooperation in enforcing the
sanctions; whether both the senders and targets are members of the
international organization that is coordinating the administration of the
sanctions; the “warmth” of prior relations between senders and targets;
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and the political system of the target nations, ranging between autocratic
and democratic.215 Economic variables include the costs imposed on the
target countries; the costs to the sender countries; prior commercial
relations between senders and targets; the relative economic size of the
targets and senders; and the economic health and political stability of
the targets.216 Effectiveness thus depends on myriad political and
economic factors, the combination of which is specific to each country.
However, the FCPA has been enforced, and will continue to be
enforced, against a very broad and open-ended swath of countries, with
widely-varying political and economic conditions. Determining which
of these countries are most likely to respond to enforcement by cracking
down on bribery would be a very detailed and time-consuming analysis,
even if the DOJ and SEC were inclined to conduct it.
The second scenario, while perhaps less hopeful, is certainly more
realistic, as the empirical evidence demonstrates that it has already
begun to occur.217 As investment opportunities continue to develop in
higher–risk countries, at least some capital-rich countries may neglect,
or even refuse, to ratify and enforce anti-bribery legislation. In sanctions
terminology, these “black knights” will move in to fill the void created
by the economic withdrawal of countries that are enforcing the OECD
convention. Companies from countries that either have not ratified the
OECD convention or do not enforce it, such as China or Russia, may
not hesitate to invest in these countries. Cuervo-Cazurro in 2006 found
this precise dynamic to be occurring, observing that “[c]orruption in the
host country results in relatively less FDI from countries that have
signed the OECD Convention, but [results] in relatively more FDI from
countries with high levels of corruption.”218 More recently, China’s
systematic investment in emerging economies in Africa, Central Asia,
and Latin America, where CPI corruption levels remain relatively high,
provides further evidence in support of these findings.219 If this dynamic
continues, companies from those countries that actively enforce anti215. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 55.
216. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 55.
217. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 809; Hines, supra note 94, at 19–20
(finding that the FCPA encouraged “ownership substitution” between U.S. investors, who were
at that time the only investors subject to anti-bribery legislation, and foreign investors).
218. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808.
219. For recent academic commentary on China’s ascendancy in Africa, see, for example.
Hany Besada, The Implications of China’s Ascendancy for Africa 1–37 (The Ctr. for Int’l
Governance
Innovation,
Working
Paper
No.
40,
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1289787; Gernot Pehnelt, The Political Economy of China’s Aid Policy
in Africa (Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-051, Aug. 22, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022868; Jian-Ye Wang, What Drives China’s Growing Role in
Africa? 1–30 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/211, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012994.
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bribery legislation will tend to seek out safer investment destinations,
which will typically exist in more developed markets. The nations of the
developed world will begin to invest in each other, while the lessdeveloped economies with less-developed anti-bribery regimes will do
the same. The world economy could slowly begin to bifurcate into two
economies: one in which bribery is tolerated and one in which it is not.
To see this scenario play out, even if only partially, would raise
innumerable problems in the ethical, economic, and foreign policy
spheres alike.
It is a regrettable irony that this may not even be the least desirable
result of the present anti-bribery enforcement regime. The third
conceivable outcome is that the developed nations will continue to
incrementally withdraw from emerging markets, but the black knights
will not substantially fill the void. In this scenario, the emerging
markets’ historic opportunities for growth, with its concomitant
economic and social benefits, will be missed. Even if bribery is
deterred, the OECD-enforcing nations will have prolonged the suffering
of poorer but otherwise promising nations. This result, while consistent
with a firm ethical commitment to reducing bribery, is ultimately
nonetheless tragic.220
B. Policy Problems Inherent in the Present Enforcement Regime
Even if these de facto sanctions were likely to succeed in effecting
reforms, it is by no means self-evident that continuing to implement
them would be a desirable course of action. That is, it is not at all clear
that the benefits would outweigh the costs. The preliminary data
suggests the possibility of substantial collateral damage that virtually no
one intended or foresaw: economic growth may be stunted in countries
that otherwise enjoy historically rare opportunities to reduce poverty,
and foreign policy alliances may be made or broken in critical and
volatile areas of the world.221
Reflecting on these potential effects exposes a fundamental, and
quite difficult, policy trade-off: if forced to choose between reducing
poverty and reducing corruption, which should we prefer? To the extent
that enforcing anti-bribery legislation stymies economic development,
and thus reducing poverty and reducing corruption are to some degree
220. For discussions of the importance of foreign direct investment to economic
development, see, for example, THEODORE MORAN, EDWARD M. GRAHAM & MAGNUS
BLOMSTROM EDS., DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT? (2005);
THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW POLICY
AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 19–25 (1998).
221. On the relation between foreign direct investment and U.S. Foreign Policy, see, for
example, EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT 95–121 (2006).
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competing goals, which should be the higher, or more immediate,
priority?
The available data on the impact of anti-bribery enforcement
supplies a preliminary answer to this question. In our enforcement of
anti-bribery legislation, we have prioritized the reduction of bribery
above the reduction of poverty. The work of Hines and Cuervo-Cazurra,
combined with the data compiled in this Article about the market types
where enforcement actions usually occur, lead inexorably to this
conclusion: those nations that are actively participating in the
enforcement of anti-bribery legislation are sacrificing, in significant
part, the opportunity to reduce poverty in the name of combating
bribery.
We should take notice of this result. While there are at least two
possible ways to justify it, neither is compelling. First, it might be said
that combating bribery actually furthers economic development, thereby
reducing poverty. By this line of reasoning, bribery and other forms of
corruption are a detriment to economic efficiency, and reducing bribery
will therefore promote efficiency and in turn promote economic
development.222 This theory, as applied, proves problematic. For
starters, emerging markets are by definition uniquely positioned at
present to experience historic economic development. The conditions
that make this growth possible have not existed forever, and it should
not be assumed that they will remain indefinitely. Meanwhile, a
significant lag time would necessarily occur before any instrumental
value, in the form of host-country legal reforms, could be realized—the
withdrawal of financial support would need to become more
pronounced, governments would need to acknowledge the withdrawal
as a consequence of the tolerance of bribery, they would need to enact
legislation in response, and then enforce it effectively. The conditions
that make emerging markets unique may or may not last long enough
for these reforms to occur, and the opportunity for extraordinary
development would be lost. If these market conditions did remain, the
years that had passed in the interim would nonetheless mark a lost
opportunity for growth. That is, even if the sanctions ultimately worked
222. See, e.g., M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political
Economy of Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. ECON. & SOC’Y 441, 448–53 (1989); Mark B. Bader
& Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
627, 627 (1983); Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption
Efforts: Current Legal Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 315, 345–47
(2004); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: The Case for Per Se
Illegality, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 390–91 (1987); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110
Q.J. ECON. 681, 705 (1995); Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the
World Trade Organization, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 305, 309 (1997), Ibrahim F.I. Shihata,
Corruption—A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J.
INT’L L. 451, 460–61 (1997).
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in promoting economic growth, people would still suffer.
The second problem with the economic justification is that
incremental reductions in bribery will not necessarily improve
economic growth. At a theoretical level, bribery impedes efficiency, and
the absolute elimination of bribery would of course improve efficiency.
But because sanctions could not completely eliminate bribery, the
question becomes whether the reduction in bribery will lead to an
increase in efficiency, and that answer is regrettably complex. Political
scientists such as Samuel Huntington223 and Mancur Olson224 have
famously observed that in transitional economies, where bureaucratic
processes are particularly inefficient, bribery may actually allow a
bypass of the inefficiency. By this ironic reasoning, in countries with
inefficient bureaucracies bribery is necessary to the efficient conduct of
business. While counterintuitive and just barely palatable, this theory
must remain on the table in discussing the impact of anti-bribery
enforcement on the economic development of emerging markets.
Alternatively, we might prefer to rely on a deontological
justification—one that is ethical rather than economic. The
deontological theory holds that bribery is absolutely wrong, and
therefore should be sanctioned regardless of its economic impact.225 By
this thinking, no amount of economic development could justify the
tolerance of, or participation in, the unethical practice of bribing
overseas government officials. If one begins from the premise that
bribery is an absolute wrong, the only appropriate response is to work
towards reducing it. The problem with this justification, however, is
even more fundamental: there is simply no evidence that Congress, or
any other deliberative body for that matter, has ever adopted this policy.
As the legislative history shows, whether bribery is an absolute and
universal moral wrong, which government should seek to immediately
eradicate regardless of the economic implications, was heavily disputed
in Congress. Unless and until politically accountable bodies adopt this
principle, it should not be used to justify the enforcement of a statute
where fines have exceeded $1 billion for a single company.226
223. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 68–69 (1968).
224. MANCUR OLSON, JR., POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND
CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 106–07 (2000).
225. The deontological approach to law has recently appeared in various legal debates. See,
e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance
Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 701 (2008)
(discussing corporate governance); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally
Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2004)
(discussing capital punishment); Robert Weisberg, The Utilitarian and Deontological
Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 333
(2004) (discussing gun control).
226. The total fines levied against Siemens A.G. by the United States and German
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C. Proposed Reforms: Deterring Bribery Without Deterring
Investment
This discussion of the uncertain justification for the present
enforcement regime is obviously meant to sound a note of caution. Still,
it must be emphasized that concern for tempering the sanction-like
effects of anti-bribery legislation does not, by any means, imply an
abandonment of the commitment to combating bribery. The purpose of
any changes in the drafting or enforcement of anti-bribery legislation
should have a very specific and limited purpose: the legislation should
create a disincentive to bribe but not a disincentive to invest. Put
another way, while it is good to deter bribery, it is far better to deter
bribery that occurs in the course of ongoing business activity.
Promoting ethical business in emerging markets is precisely the purpose
of the FCPA.227
There are numerous reforms to the text and enforcement of antibribery legislation that would advance the policy of reducing bribery
without scaring companies away from emerging markets. The first and
most obvious is to bring the remainder of the capital-rich countries into
the OECD Convention. The black knight effect occurs because capitalrich countries with substantial FDI capacity, but that are not subject to
anti-bribery legislation, still exist, just as they did prior to enactment of
the OECD Convention. The playing field remains uneven. Most
notably, of the four largest emerging markets—Brazil, Russia, India,
and China (the BRICs)228—Brazil is the only one to have adopted the
Convention.229 The OECD is presently engaged in negotiations with the
authorities exceeded this amount. For the DOJ press release, see Press Release, Department of
Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html [hereinafter DOJ
Press Release].
227. For further commentary on the role of private investment in curbing bribery, see, for
example, Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead the Next
Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45, 47–48 (2006); Paul
D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2007, at 109, 136–38; Roger C. Cramton, Counseling
Organizational Clients “Within the Bounds of the Law,” 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1043, 1058
(2006); José Armando Fanjul, Comment, Corporate Corruption in Latin America: Acceptance,
Bribery, Compliance, Denial, Economics, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26 PENN ST.
INT’L L. REV. 735, 758 (2008).
228. Goldman Sachs first coined the acronym “BRIC” in 2001 to describe the four
emerging markets that, by 2050, could replace most of the current G6 members in terms of
GDP. See Goldman Sachs, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/index.html (last visited
Oct. 7, 2009).
229. OECD Convention, supra note 5. For the list of countries that have adopted the
Convention, see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
http://www.oecd.org/document/44/0,3343,en_2649_34859_36433004_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last
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remaining three, finding varying degrees of success. Mere adoption of
the Convention, of course, is not enough, and the countries must
meaningfully enforce it. While the day when China, Russia, and India
demonstrate a resolve to eradicating bribery that is commensurate to the
more developed nations may not be imminent, it is clearly the first and
most important piece of a long-term anti-bribery agenda.
A complementary piece to pursue concurrently is the broad
implementation and enforcement of demand-side anti-bribery laws.
Several conventions currently exist, at least on paper, that go beyond the
supply-side legislation of the FCPA and OECD and prohibit the
solicitation or receipt of bribes. Some have been ratified by the member
nations of important emerging market governmental organizations,
including the Organization of American States’ Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption,230 and the African Union’s Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption.231 More generally, in 2004
the United Nations passed the Convention Against Corruption,232 which
requires each member state to adopt legislation criminalizing not only
the offer of a bribe but also its solicitation or acceptance. Similarly,
international financial institutions such as the World Bank233 and the
IMF234 have adopted guidelines that deny funding to governments
whose officials have solicited or accepted bribes. Less formally, the
International Chamber of Commerce has adopted rules addressing the
demand of bribes, and has urged businesses around the world to
implement them.235 To the extent that these conventions and guidelines
are adopted and enforced, companies will be less fearful of doing
visited Oct. 7, 2009).
230. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. VI(1)(a), Mar. 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 724, 729 (1996); see Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption: A Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J.
INT’L L. 243, 244–45 (1998).
231. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, arts. 4(1)(b),
11(3), http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Convention%20on%20Co
mbating%20Corruption.pdf.
232. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, arts. 15–16, U.N. Doc. A/58/4 (Oct.
31, 2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004). For a more thorough discussion of the convention’s
history and substance, see Weiss, supra note 3, at 480–81.
233. See POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, THE WORLD BANK, HELPING
COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 23–27 (1997),
www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corruptn.pdf.
234. News Brief No. 97/15, International Monetary Fund, IMF Adopts Guidelines
Regarding Governance Issues ¶ 16 (Aug. 4, 1997), available at www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb
/1997/nb9715.htm.
235. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMBATING EXTORTION AND BRIBERY, ICC
RULES OF CONDUCT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2005), http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/IC
C/policy/anticorruption/statements/ICC_Rules_of_Conduct_and_Recommendations%20_2005
%20Revision.pdf.
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business in the previously higher-risk emerging markets.
The demonstrated sanctions-like effect of the FCPA further suggests
that the calculation of corporate criminal penalties bears reexamination.
The FCPA provides that a corporation may be fined the greater of twice
the gross gain or loss that resulted from the bribery,236 and in recent
cases, this formula has resulted in staggering penalties.237 Factoring the
sanctions-like impact of these penalties into the equation might yield
figures that still punish companies for wrongdoing but do not scare
them away from foreign emerging markets that badly need their
capital.238
More fundamentally, we should reevaluate the underlying theories of
liability by which the government holds corporations accountable for
FCPA violations. Indeed, one commentator has observed that “nothing
magnifies the impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on
corporations more than respondeat superior,” the common law doctrine
by which employers are held liable for the conduct of their
employees.239 As the U.S. Sentencing Commission explained,
Criminal liability can attach to an organization whenever an
employee of the organization commits an act within the
apparent scope of his or her employment, even if the
employee acted directly contrary to company policy and
instructions. An entire organization, despite its best efforts
to prevent wrongdoing in its ranks, can still be held
criminally liable for any of its employees’ illegal actions.240

236. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(A)-(B) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A)-(B). Subject to this
maximum, the amount of the fine is governed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B4.1 (2008); see ZARIN, supra note 18, at 8–4.
Additionally, engaging in an act of bribery can result in the suspension or debarment of a
contractor or subcontractor from continuing to do business with the U.S. Government pursuant
to the Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. Ch. 1 (2008), and an indictment or conviction
under the FCPA can adversely impact an application for a license to export defense-related
articles or services pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (Supp. 2006). Id.
237. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 226; Press Release, Department of Justice, Kellogg
Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million
Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/press_releases/200
9/02/02-11-09kellogg-guilty.pdf.
238. For commentary on the impact of the FCPA on international business, see, for
example, H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government’s Campaign
Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 430 (1999); Ellen S.
Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 325, 330 (1997); Ashe, supra note 24, at 2904.
239. The FCPA Blog: News and Views about the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, In the Master’s Defense http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/11/24/in-the-mastersdefense.html (Nov. 24, 2008, 08:22 EST).
240. PAOLA DESIO, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
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It is easy to imagine the impact of this doctrine in the FCPA context.
Defendants are often large publicly-traded companies with ventures in
various countries and various cultures. In some of these countries,
bribery has long been regarded as a customary, acceptable, and even
necessary way of doing business with a government that is likely
perceived as egregiously inefficient and inherently corrupt.
Recognizing the risk, a company might implement a broad compliance
program that includes rigorous anti-bribery training for its employees.
Nonetheless, if a lower-level employee eager to close a deal pays a
bribe, the company is criminally liable. Penalizing companies for such
acts, despite their best preventative efforts, perverts the purposes of the
FCPA. By penalizing bribery, it creates a risk that large international
companies feel they cannot afford to take. They financially withdraw
from higher-risk markets, rather than building alliances with those
nations in the way that those who testified before Congress anticipated.
Rather than lending financial and political support to emerging markets,
the statute may punish the countries in which these companies would
otherwise invest.
The outer limits of the doctrine were recently challenged in a Second
Circuit case.241 Though it concerned environmental rather than antibribery laws, it involved arguments that are at least as applicable to the
FCPA context. An amicus brief co-authored by the former Enron
prosecutor, Andrew Weissmann, echoed the admonition of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and described the dangers of an overly broad
application of respondeat superior:
A criminal indictment can be a life-or-death matter
for a company. Yet, the vast sweep of the district court’s
standard for the imposition of vicarious criminal liability
makes corporations accountable for almost all criminal
acts of any low level employees—even those acting
GUIDELINES 1 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf.
241. United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009). The defendantappellant was a company incorporated in Liberia with its principal place of business in Greece,
and was convicted of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution on Ships for failing to maintain
appropriate records of its petroleum deliveries while in U.S. waters. Id. at 305. The defendant,
as well as an amicus, argued that a company should not be held liable under respondeat superior
unless it “lacked effective policies and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by its
employees.” Id. at 310. The Second Circuit held that the absence of such policies and
procedures is not “a separate element,” and thus irrelevant to liability under respondeat superior.
Id. The Wall Street Journal reported that Judge Calabresi, former Dean of the Yale Law School,
found amicus’ argument in particular “interesting” and that it “appealed” to him as an
“academic[],” but further stated, “[w]hether we should do something about this as judges is a
different matter.” Posting of Amir Efrati to WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/11/21/former-enron-prosecutor-criminal-charges-shouldnt-be-soeasy/ (Nov. 21, 2008, 15:11 EST).
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against explicit instructions and in the face of the most
robust corporate compliance program.242
The same brief compellingly explained that the doctrine forces
companies to settle criminal charges and forego the opportunity to
prove their innocence at trial:
[Respondeat superior] has caused a tremendous imbalance
between the power of a prosecutor and a corporate
defendant. Given the hair-trigger for corporate liability
even for the most responsible corporate citizen, many
corporations forego any defenses in order to resolve
threatened prosecution. . . . The potential for inappropriate
prosecutorial pressure is particularly heightened in the area
of corporate criminal investigations that end in Draconian
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements,
where no court has oversight authority. There, the
prosecutor effectively serves as both judge and jury.
Because of the disastrous consequences of a corporate
indictment and the ease with which corporations may be
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
corporations are under immense pressure to agree to almost
any terms. The vast majority of these negotiations go on
behind closed doors, with little public scrutiny and no
judicial review.243
This precise dynamic can be observed with powerful effect in the
FCPA context, where companies routinely settle their charges through
deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements to avoid the
damaging publicity of a criminal trial.244
242. Brief for The Association of Corporate Counsel, et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of
Appellant Urging Reversal at 20,United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009)
(No. 07-5801-CR).
243. Id. at 20, 22.
244. For a thorough discussion of the role of respondeat superior in FCPA enforcement, see
the series of entries at The FCPA Blog: News and Views about the United States Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/tag/respondeat-superior. Dick Cassin, the
blog author, argues,
[R]espondeat superior does more harm than good. Sure, it produces a 100%
corporate ‘conviction’ rate in FCPA cases, which must go down well at the
Justice Department. But, it probably doesn’t deter illegal behavior or encourage
better compliance programs. And it puts overwhelming pressure on
organizations to resolve threatened criminal cases. Because of the catastrophic
effects of any potential conviction, companies have to settle with the
government. So they rush into agreements that may require them to waive the
attorney–client privilege, hand over employees’ private documents and data,
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Although the Second Circuit in United States v. Ionia Management
S.A. affirmed the lower court’s judgment against the defendant,245 the
case further exposes ever-increasing cracks in the respondeat superior
dam. Scholars have generated a substantial body of research calling for
a more deliberate application of the doctrine, one that more effectively
advances the underlying policies of punishment and deterrence.246 One
remedy, proposed by Professor Ellen Podgor, is to recognize a good
faith defense for corporations where the violation occurred despite the
defendant company’s best preventative efforts.247 Indeed, such a
defense would substantially mitigate the sanctioning effect of FCPA
enforcement, as the risk of doing business in foreign markets would
significantly decrease.
VI. CONCLUSION: DESTINED TO REPEAT HISTORY?
In concluding their comprehensive analysis of the history of
economic sanctions, HSEO issued a striking admonition, which now
cut off support for their legal defense, and fire those who don’t cooperate with
government investigations.
The FCPA Blog: News and Views about the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/22/naked-corporate-defendants.html (Jan. 22, 2009,
08:28 EST), http://fcpablog.blogspot.com/2009/01/naked-corporate-defendants.html. He
concludes that “[i]t is time to fix respondeat superior—either in court or in Congress.” Id. at In
the Master’s Defense (Nov. 24, 2008), http://fcpablog.blogspot.com/2008/11/in-mastersdefense.html.
245. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d at 311.
246. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 866–67 (1994); Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and
Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 113 (2007); Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under
the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 630–32 (1988); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious
Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their Employees and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV.
279, 327–28 (1995); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1182–83 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
“Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 246 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No
Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 386, 459 (1981); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The
Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 412–14 (1999); V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1532–34 (1996);
Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative Defense, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2007); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and
Other High-Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1434 (2007); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance
Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L.
REV. 605, 689 (1995); Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 451 (2007); Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1367–75 (1979).
247. Podgor, supra note 238, at 1538.
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applies with equal force to members of the international law
enforcement community who are poised to greatly increase the
enforcement of anti-bribery legislation:
Sender governments should think through their means and
objectives before taking a final decision to deploy
sanctions. Leaders in the sender country should be
confident that their goals are within their reach, that they
can impose sufficient economic pain to command the
attention of the target country . . . that their efforts will not
prompt offsetting policies by other powers, and that the
sanctions chosen will not impose insupportable costs on
their domestic constituents and foreign allies. These
propitious conditions arise less often than the leaders of
major powers seem to imagine.248
In relation to the FCPA and the OECD convention, there is
absolutely no indication that sender governments have adequately
thought through their means. A public debate about whether to
withdraw investment from emerging markets in the name of combating
bribery has simply never occurred. As the above analysis is intended to
show, overwhelming evidence now exists that such a debate should
occur, and promptly. This article has proposed several possible
reforms—expanding the signatories to the OECD convention,
promoting demand-side legislation, tempering the use of respondeat
superior—that might effectively implement international anti-bribery
norms without stymieing economic development. Further public
discussion on the purpose and effect of anti-bribery legislation would
likely elicit many others.
While the goal of reducing bribery is no longer controversial, the
question of how to do so has thus proven quite complex. Indeed, it has
become more complex, not less, since 1977. In sum, Senator Proxmire’s
original introduction to the congressional inquiry into the need for antibribery legislation is even more appropriate today than it was then:
“Virtually every [one] . . . thinks bribery is a dreadful thing. There is no
dispute about that. The question . . . is the remedy.”249

248. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 178.
249. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 75 (statement of Sen. William
Proxmire).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

57

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 2

408

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

VII. APPENDIX: CATEGORIZING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY MARKET
TYPE
This appendix briefly defines the several market types used in this
study, and explains how the countries in which FCPA violations have
occurred are categorized into those types. A spreadsheet follows that
shows, for each FCPA enforcement action, the country or countries in
which the violation occurred, the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index ranking of each country, and its market type as
defined by S&P.
There is almost no legal scholarship identifying the distinctive legal
features of emerging markets. Despite the term’s wide usage today and
the general recognition that law and politics figure prominently in the
development of emerging markets, legal scholars lag well behind the
community of legal and financial practitioners in understanding this
phenomenon. A useful general characterization of emerging markets—
and to this author’s knowledge, the only available definition in the law
review literature, though written by a World Bank economist rather than
a lawyer—explains that emerging markets are principally distinguished
by two characteristics: volatility and transition.250 They are volatile in
several related respects: the value of financial assets and volume of
financial output vary dramatically; they are subject to price shocks;
domestic policy is comparatively unstable; government regulation and
intervention tends to be “pro–cyclical,” meaning that it tends to
exacerbate both booms and recessions; and investors often perceive
policymaking as arbitrary.251 Emerging markets tend to be transitional
in the sense that they have recently moved to a market economy from a
planned economy; both their economic and political institutions are
changing dramatically; there is a relatively short history of foreign
investment; they are witnessing a rapid increase in the market’s
participation in the international economy; and they generally are
experiencing dramatic changes in such demographic factors as fertility
rates, life expectancy, and educational status.252
Frontier markets, by comparison, might be thought of as nascent
emerging markets (a nearly redundant phrase, but still illustrative). They
exhibit the same characteristics as emerging markets, but to a different
degree: they are not quite as far along in their transition, and are
somewhat more volatile. Owing to the relative newness of the term,
legal academic definitions are, perhaps fittingly, less developed than the
250. Ashoka Mody, What is an Emerging Market?, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 641, 643 (2004).
251. Id. at 641–45.
252. Id. at 642, 645. For a more technical description of the financial characteristics of
emerging markets, see Wei Li & Richard Hoyer-Ellefsen, Characteristics of Emerging Markets
(Oct. 21, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909890.
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term emerging markets, and this author could locate none. One
investment company provides a very simple and useful definition:
frontier markets “demonstrate a relative openness and accessibility for
foreign investors” and are not “undergoing a period of extreme
economic and political instability.”253 Emerging markets and frontier
markets, then, are different in degree but similar in kind. For this
reason, they are combined into a single category of emerging markets
for purpose of this Article, although the following spreadsheet preserves
the distinction.
While various investment firms have provided slightly differing lists
of emerging markets,254 this Article will rely on the categories created
by S&P. A combination of its indices of emerging markets and frontier
markets yields the following list: Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote
d’Ivorie, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia,
Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United
Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.255 Countries that are more
developed than the above are here referred to as “developed” in the
spreadsheet and countries that are less developed are called “less
developed.”
Calculating the number of alleged violations that have occurred in
these countries, for the specific purpose of identifying the patterns
among various types of markets, requires a number of methodological
253. Product Insights, MSCI Barra, MSCI Frontier Market Indices 2 (Dec. 18, 2007),
available at http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/fm/MSCI_Frontier_Markets.pdf.
254. See, e.g., FTSE, FTSE Global Equity Index Series Country Classification 2 (2009),
http://ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/Downloads/FTSE_Country_Classification_Sept_
09_update.pdf; MSCI Barra, MSCI Blobal Investable Market Indices Methodology 57 (2009),
http://www.mscibarra.com/eqb/methodology/meth_docs/MSCI_Aug09_GIMIMethod.pdf.
255. See Standard & Poor’s, The S&P Emerging Markets Database Brochure, available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/brochure_EMDB.pdf. (Standard & Poor’s,
S&P/IFCG Extended Frontier 150, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/inde
x/SP_IFCG_Extended_Frontier_150_Factsheet.pdf. The purpose of this analysis is to anticipate
the effect of FCPA enforcement patterns on contemporary investment decisions. Accordingly,
countries in which FCPA violations have historically occurred are categorized based on S&P’s
contemporary market definitions—for instance, a country in which a violation occurred in 1985
may be categorized, for purposes of this analysis, as an emerging market based on its 2008
market conditions, rather than its 1985 conditions. A decision to invest in a particular country
will of course be based on contemporary market conditions, but the impact of FCPA
enforcement patterns on that decision will be based, at least in part, on where the violations have
historically occurred.
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decisions. Where a single case involved bribery in multiple countries,
each country is counted once. If there were multiple cases concerning
the same set of transactions—for instance, separate criminal actions
against multiple defendants or overlapping DOJ and SEC cases—each
country in which bribery occurred is counted only once. Where two
unrelated cases involved bribery in the same country, that country is
counted twice. This list does not include countries in which transactions
were suspected to have occurred but which were not part of the
underlying facts of the conviction or settlement. Finally, two older cases
that involved an extraordinarily high number of countries256 were not
included in the tally because they would disproportionately influence
the numbers. Otherwise, this index includes every alleged violation that
resulted in a finding of liability, a conviction, or a settlement, between
the original passage of the FCPA and October of 2008.
The totals, as indicated in the spreadsheet below, are as follows.
There have been 125 “violations” of the FCPA from its ratification to
October of 2008. Of those, thirty-three occurred in less developed
markets, six occurred in frontier markets, seventy-seven occurred in
emerging markets, and nine occurred in developed markets. The Article
combines frontier and emerging markets, to produce a total of eightythree violations in that market type.

256. SEC v. Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
96,922 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,699 (D.D.C. 1980).
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Year

2008
2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v. Albert
Jackson Stanley, 08-CR597 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
Nigeria
United States v. Faro
Technologies Inc. (2008) China
United States v. AGA
Med. Corp., 08-CR00172-1 (D. Minn. 2008) China
United States v. Willbros
Group, Inc. 08-CR-0287
(S.D. Tex. 2008); United
States v. Steph, 4:07-CR00307 (S.D. Tex. 2007);
SEC v. Brown, 4:06-CV02919 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
United States v. Brown,
4:06-CR-00316 (2006)
Nigeria
United States v. Willbros
Group, Inc., 08-CR-0287
(S.D. Tex. 2008); United
States v. Steph, 4:07-CR00307 (S.D. Tex. 2007);
SEC v. Brown, 4:06-CV02919 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
United States v. Brown,
4:06-CR-00316 (2006)
Ecuador
United States v. Willbros
Group, Inc., 08-CR-0287
(S.D. Tex. 2008); United
States v. Steph, 4:07-CR00307 (S.D. Tex. 2007);
SEC v. Brown, 4:06-CV02919 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
United States v. Brown,
4:06-CR-00316 (2006)
Bolivia
United States v. Self,
8:08-CR-00110 (S.D. Cal.
2008)
UK
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Emerging

121

Emerging

72

Emerging

72

Emerging

121

Frontier

151

Less
Developed

102

Developed

16
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Year

2008

2008

2008

2008

2007

2007

2007

2007

Matter(s)
United States v. AB
Volvo (2008); United
States v. Volvo Constr.
Equip. AB, 1:08-CR00069 (D.D.C. 2008);
United States v. Renault
Trucks SAS, 1:08-CR00069 (D.D.C. 2008)
United States v.
Flowserve Corp. (2008);
United States v.
Flowserve Pompes SAS,
1:08-CR-00035 (D.D.C.
2008)
United States v.
Westinghouse Air Brake
Tech. Corp. (2008)
SEC v. Con-Way Inc.,
1:08-CV-01478 (D.D.C.
2008)
United States v. Smith,
8:07-CR-00069 (C.D.
Cal. 2007)
United States v. Akzo
Nobel, N.V. (2007); SEC
v. Azko Nobel, N.V., No.
07-CV-02293 (D.D.C.
2007)
United States v. Chevron
Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
SEC v. Chevron Corp.,
No. 07-CIV 10299
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)
United States v. Lucent
Tech. (2007); SEC v.
Lucent Technologies Inc.,
No. 07-CV-02301
(D.D.C. 2007)
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Iraq

Less
Developed

178

Iraq

Less
Developed

178

India

Emerging

85

Philippines

Emerging

141

UK

Developed

16

Iraq

Less
Developed

178

Iraq

Less
Developed

178

China

Emerging

72
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Year

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v. IngersollRand Co. (2007); United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand
Italiana SpA, 1:07-CR00294 (D.D.C. 2007);
United States v. Thermo
King Ireland Ltd., 1:07CR-00296 (D.D.C. 2007);
SEC v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., No. 07-CV-1955
(D.D.C. 2007)
Iraq
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Iraq
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Bahrain
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Egypt
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) India
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) China
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Nigeria
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Turkey
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Market
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TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Less
Developed

178

Less
Developed

178

Emerging

43

Emerging

115

Emerging

85

Emerging

72

Emerging

121

Emerging
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Year

2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v. York
Int’l Corp. (2007); SEC v.
York Int’l Corp., No. 07CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) UAE
United States v. Paradigm
B.V. (2007)
China
United States v. Paradigm
B.V. (2007)
Indonesia
United States v. Paradigm
B.V. (2007)
Kazakhstan
United States v. Paradigm
B.V. (2007)
Mexico
United States v. Paradigm
B.V. (2007)
Nigeria
United States v. Textron,
Inc. (2007); SEC v.
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV01505 (D.D.C. 2007)
Iraq
United States v. Textron,
Inc. (2007); SEC v.
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV01505 (D.D.C. 2007)
UAE
United States v. Textron,
Inc. (2007); SEC v.
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV01505 (D.D.C. 2007)
Bangladesh
United States v. Textron,
Inc. (2007); SEC v.
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV01505 (D.D.C. 2007)
Indonesia
United States v. Textron,
Inc. (2007); SEC v.
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV01505 (D.D.C. 2007)
Egypt
United States v. Textron,
Inc. (2007); SEC v.
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV01505 (D.D.C. 2007)
India
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[Vol. 62

S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Emerging

35

Emerging

72

Emerging

126

Emerging

145

Emerging

72

Emerging

121

Less
Developed

178

Emerging

35

Frontier

147

Emerging

126

Emerging

115

Emerging

85

64
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2010]

ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION

Year

2007

2007

2007

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v. Ott, 07CR-608 (D.N.J. 2007);
United States v. Young,
07-CR-609 (D.N.J. 2007);
United States v. Amoako,
3:05-01122 (D.N.J.
2005); SEC v. Amoako,
3:05-MJ-01122 (D.N.J.
2005); SEC v. Ott , 3:06CV-04195 (D.N.J. 2006) Nigeria
United States v. Ott, 07CR-608 (D.N.J. 2007);
United States v. Young,
07-CR-609 (D.N.J. 2007);
United States v. Amoako,
3:05-01122 (D.N.J.
2005); SEC v. Amoako,
3:05-MJ-01122 (D.N.J.
2005); SEC v. Ott, 3:06CV-04195 (D.N.J. 2006) Rwanda
United States v. Ott, 07CR-608 (D.N.J. 2007);
United States v. Young,
07-CR-609 (D.N.J. 2007);
United States v. Amoako,
3:05-01122 (D.N.J.
2005); SEC v. Amoako,
3:05-MJ-01122 (D.N.J.
2005); SEC v. Ott, 3:06CV-04195 (D.N.J. 2006) Senegal
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Emerging

121

Less
Developed

102

Less
Developed

85

65
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Year

2007

2007

2007

Violation
Location

[Vol. 62

S&P
Market
Type

Matter(s)
United States v. Wooh,
07-CR-244 (D. Or. 2007);
SEC v. Wooh, 07-CV-957
(D. Or. 2007); United
States v. SSI Int’l Far
East, Ltd., CR 06-398 (D.
Or. 2006); United States
v. Schnitzer Steel Indus.
(Ind. 2006); In re
Schnitzer Steel Indus.,
Inc. , SEC Admin Proc.
File No. 3-12456 (2006) China
Emerging
United States v. Wooh,
07-CR-244 (D. Or. 2007);
SEC v. Wooh, 07-CV-957
(D. Or. 2007); United
States v. SSI Int’l Far
East, Ltd., CR 06-398 (D.
Or. 2006); United States
v. Schnitzer Steel Indus.
(Ind. 2006); In re
Schnitzer Steel Indus.,
Inc. , SEC Admin Proc.
File No. 3-12456 (2006) South Korea Emerging
United States v. Baker
Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc.,
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex.
2007); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc.,
(2007); SEC v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408
(S.D. Tex. 2007)
Kazakhstan Emerging
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TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

72

40

145

66
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Year

2007

2007

2007

2007

Matter(s)
United States v. Baker
Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc.,
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex.
2007); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc.,
(2007); SEC v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408
(S.D. Tex. 2007)
United States v. Baker
Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc.
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex.
2007); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc.,
(2007); SEC v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408
(S.D. Tex. 2007)
United States v. Baker
Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc.
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex.
2007); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc.,
(2007); SEC v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408
(S.D. Tex. 2007)
United States v. Baker
Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc.
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex.
2007); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc.,
(2007); SEC v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408
(S.D. Tex. 2007)
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Violation
Location

417

S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Angola

Less
Developed

158

Nigeria

Emerging

121

Indonesia

Emerging

126

Russia

Emerging

147

67
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Year

2007

2007
2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

Matter(s)
United States v. Baker
Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc.
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex.
2007); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc.,
(2007); SEC v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408
(S.D. Tex. 2007)
United States v. Vetco
Gray Controls Ltd., 4:07CR-00004 (S.D. Tex.
2007); United States v.
Aibel Group Ltd., 4:07CR-00005 (S.D. Tex.
2007); SEC v. John
Samson, 1:06-CV-01217
(D.D.C. 2006)
SEC v. Fu, No. 07-CV01735 (D.D.C. 2007)
In re Bristow Group Inc.,
SEC Admin. Proceeding
(File No. 3-12833)
SEC v. Srinivasan, 07CV-1699 (D.D.C. 2007);
In re Electronic Data Sys.
Corp., SEC Admin.
Proceeding File No. 312825 (Sept. 25, 2007)
(EDS/Kearney)
SEC v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 07-CV-1352
(D.D.C. 2007); In re
Delta & Pine Land Co.,
SEC Admin Proceeding
File No. 3-12712 (2007)
SEC v. Dow Chem. Co.,
07-CV-00336 (D.D.C.
2007)
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Violation
Location

[Vol. 62

S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Uzbekistan

Less
Developed

166

Nigeria

Emerging

121

Taiwan

Emerging

39

Nigeria

Emerging

121

India

Emerging

85

Turkey

Emerging

58

India

Emerging

85

68
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Year

2007

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
SEC v. El Paso Corp, 07CV-00899 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)
Iraq
SEC v. Tyco Int’l Ltd.,
06-CV-2942 (S.D.N.Y.
2006)
Brazil
SEC v. Tyco Int’l Ltd.,
06-CV-2942 (S.D.N.Y.
2006)
South Korea
In re Oil States Int’l, SEC
Admin. Proc. File No. 312280 (2006)
Venezuela
United States v.
Sapsizian, 1:06-CR20797 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
Costa Rica
United States v. SSI Int’l
Far East, Ltd., CR 06-398
(D. Or. 2006); United
States v. Schnitzer Steel
Indus. (Ind. 2006); In re
Schnitzer Steel Indus.,
Inc., SEC Admin Proc.
File No. 3-12456 (2006) South Korea
United States v. Statoil
ASA, 06-CR-00960
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Statoil ASA, SEC Admin.
Proc. File No. 3-12453
(2006)
Iran
United States v. Head, 06CR-01380 (S.D. Cal.
2006)
Benin
United States v. Novak,
05-180-3 (E.D. Wash.
2006)
Liberia
United States v. Salam,
06-CR-00157 (D.D.C.
2006)
Iraq
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Less
Developed

178

Emerging

80

Emerging

40

Emerging

158

Less
Developed

47

Emerging

40

Less
Developed

141

Less
Developed

96

Less
Developed

138

Less
Developed

178

69
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Year

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v. Kozeny,
CR 05-518 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); United States v.
Bodmer, CR-03-947
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); United
States v. Omega
Advisors, Inc. (2007);
United States v. Lewis,
CR-03-930 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); United States v.
Farrell, CR-03-290
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)
Azerbaijan
United States v. DPC
(Tianjin) Co. Ltd., CR 05482 (C.D. Cal. 2005); In
re Diagnostic Prods.
Corp. SEC Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-11933 (2005) China
United States v.
Monsanto Co. (2005);
SEC v. Monsanto Co., 05CV-14 (D.D.C. 2005);
United States v. Martin,
07-CV-00434 (D.D.C.
2007)
Indonesia
United States v. InVision
Tech., Inc. (2005); SEC v.
GE InVision, Inc., 3:05CV-00660 (N.D. Cal.
(2005); SEC v. Pillor,
1:06-C-4906 (N.D. Cal.
2006)
Thailand
United States v. InVision
Tech., Inc. (2005); SEC v.
GE InVision, Inc., 3:05CV-00660 (N.D. Cal.
(2005); SEC v. Pillor,
1:06-C-4906 (N.D. Cal.
2006)
China
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[Vol. 62

S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Less
Developed

158

Emerging

72

Emerging

126

Emerging

80

Emerging

72

70
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Year

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

2005

2005
2004

2004
2004

2004

2004

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v. InVision
Tech., Inc. (2005); SEC v.
GE InVision, Inc., 3:05CV-00660 (N.D. Cal.
(2005); SEC v. Pillor,
1:06-C-4906 (N.D. Cal.
2006)
Philippines
United States v. Micrus
Corp. (2005)
France
United States v. Micrus
Corp. (2005)
Turkey
United States v. Micrus
Corp. (2005)
Spain
United States v. Micrus
Corp. (2005)
Germany
United States v. Titan
Corp., CR 05-314 (S.D.
Cal. 2005); SEC v. Titan
Corp., 05-CV-0411
(D.D.C. 2005)
Benin
United States v.
Thompson & Reilly,
2:04-CR-00240 (N.D. Al.
2005)
Saudi Arabia
SEC v. Schering-Plough
Corp. (D.D.C. 2004)
Poland
In re BJ Servs. Co., SEC
Admin. Proc. File No. 311427 (2004)
Argentina
SEC v. ABB, Ltd.
(D.D.C. 2004)
Nigeria
United States v. ABB
Vetco Gray Inc. (S.D.
Tex. 2004)
Angola
United States v. ABB
Vetco Gray Inc. (S.D.
Tex. 2004)
Kazakhstan
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Emerging

141

Developed

23

Emerging

58

Developed

28

Developed

14

Less
Developed

96

Emerging

80

Emerging

58

Emerging

109

Emerging

121

Less
Developed

158

Emerging

145

71
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Year

2003
2002
2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2001

Violation
Location

[Vol. 62

S&P
Market
Type

Matter(s)
United States v. Giffen,
03-663 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
United States v. Williams,
03-CR-406 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)
Kazakhstan Emerging
SEC v. BellSouth Corp.
(N.D. Ga. 2002)
Venezuela
Emerging
SEC v. BellSouth Corp.
Less
(N.D. Ga. 2002)
Nicaragua
Developed
United States v. Pitchford,
CR 1:02-00365 (S.D.N.Y.
Less
2002)
Turkmenistan Developed
United States v. Syncor
Taiwan, Inc., CR-02-1244
(C.D. Cal. 2002); SEC v.
Syncor Int’l Corp., 022421 (D.D.C. 2002)
Taiwan
Emerging
United States v. Sengupta,
CR-02-40 (D.D.C. 2002);
United States v. Basu,
Frontier
CR-02-475 (D.D.C. 2002) Kenya
United States v. Kay, CR4-01-914 (S.D. Tex.
2001); United States v.
Kay, CR-4-01-914 (S.D.
Tex. 2002); SEC v.
Murphy, H-02-2908 (S.D.
Less
Tex. 2002)
Haiti
Developed
In re Baker Hughes Inc.,
SEC Admin Proc. File
No. 3-10572 (2001); SEC
v. KPMG-SSH, 01-3105
(S.D. Tex. 2001); SEC v.
Mattson, 01-3106 (S.D.
Tex. 2001)
Indonesia
Emerging
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TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

145
158
158

166

39

147

177

126

72
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Year

2001

2001
2001

2001

2000

1999

1999

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
In re Chiquita Brands
Int’l, Inc., SEC Admin
Proc File NO. 3-10613
(2001); SEC v. Chiquita
Brands Int’l, Inc., 1:01CV-02079 (D.D.C. 2001) Colombia
United States v. Halford,
et al, 01-CR-221 (W.D.
Mo. 2001); United States
v. Reitz, CR-01-222
(W.D. Mo. 2001); United
States v. King, CR-01190 (W.D. Mo. 2001)
Costa Rica
United States v. Rothrock,
CR-343 (W.D. Tex. 2001) Russia
United States v. Cantor,
CR-01-687 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); In re Am. Bank
Note Holographics, Inc.,
SEC Admin Proc File No.
3-01532 (2001); SEC v.
Am.Bank Note
Holographics, Inc., 01CV-6453 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); SEC v. Cantor, 03CV-2488 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)
Saudi Arabia
SEC v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 00-CV-3040
(D.D.C. 2000)
Argentina
United States v. Metcalf
& Eddy (99-CV-12566)
(D. Mass. 1999)
Egypt
United States v. Int’l
Material Solutions, CR-399-008 (S.D. Ohio 1999);
United States v. Control
Sys. Specialist, CR-3-98073 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
Brazil
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Emerging

70

Less
Developed

47

Emerging

147

Emerging

80

Emerging

109

Emerging

115

Emerging

80

73
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Year

1998

1998

1997

1996

1994

1994

1994

1993
1990

1990

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v.
Tannenbaum, CR-98-784
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)
Argentina
United States v. Saybolt
N. Amer. Inc., CR-9810266 (D. Mass. 1998);
United States v. Mead,
CR-98-240-01, D.N.J.
1998)
Panama
SEC v. Triton Energy
Corp., 1:97-CV-00401
(D.D.C. 1997)
Indonesia
SEC v. Montedison,
S.P.A., 1:96-CV-02631
(D.D.C. 1996)
Italy
United States v. Lockheed
Corp., CR-1-94-22-016
(N.D. Ga. (1994); United
States v. Love (N.D. Ga.
1994); United States v.
Nassar (N.D. Ga. 1994) Egypt
United States v. Vitusa
Corp., CR-94-253 (D.N.J.
1994); United States v.
Herzberg, CR-94-254
Dominican
(1994)
Republic
United States v. Steindler,
et al, CR-1-94-29 (S.D.
Ohio 1994)
Israel
United States v. Am.
Totalisator Co. (D. Md.
1993)
Greece
United States v. Dornier
GmbH (D. Minn. 1990) Niger
United States v. Harris
Corp., CR-90-0456 (N.D.
Cal. 1990)
Colombia
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[Vol. 62

S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Emerging

109

Emerging

85

Emerging

126

Developed

55

Emerging

115

Less
Developed

102

Emerging

33

Developed
Less
Developed

57
115

Emerging

70

74
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Year

1990

1991

1994
1989

1989

1991

1986

1985

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
United States v. FG
Mason Eng’g, Inc., B-9029 (D. Conn. 1990)
Germany
United States v. Eagle
Bus Mfg., B-91-171 (S.D.
Tex. 1991); United States
v. Morton, CR-3-90-061
(N.D. Tex. 1990); United
States v. Blondek, 3-9062 (N.D. Tex. 1990);
United States v. Castle
(N.D. Tex. 1990)
Canada
United States v. Young &
Rubicam, Inc., CR-N-8968 (D. Conn. 1990);
Abrahams v. Young &
Rubicam, Inc. (D. Conn.
1994)
Jamaica
United States v. Pou
Dominican
(S.D. Fla. 1989)
Republic
United States v.
Goodyear, CR-89-0156
(D.D.C. 1989)
Iraq
United States v. Napco
Int’l, Inc. CR-4-89-65 (D.
Minn. 1989); United
States v. Liebo, CR-4-89- Niger (
76 (D. Minn. 1989)
SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,
86-CV-1904 (D.D.C.
1986); Howes v. Atkins,
83-CV-279 (E.D. Ky.
(1987); Williams v. Hall,
84-CV-149 (E.D. Ky.
1988)
Oman
United States v. Silicon
Contractors, CR-85-251
(E.D. La. 1985)
Mexico
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Developed

14

Developed

9

Frontier
Less
Developed

96
102

Less
Developed

178

Less
Developed

115

Emerging

41

Emerging

72

75
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Year

1985

1983

1983

1983

1979
1979

Violation
Location

[Vol. 62

S&P
Market
Type

Matter(s)
United States v. Carpenter
& Kirkpatrick, CR-85353 (D.N.J. 1985); United
States v. Carpenter
(D.N.J. 1985)
Nigeria
Emerging
United States v. Applied
Process Prods. Overseas,
CR-83-00004 (D.D.C.
1983); United States v.
Batan, CR-83-00005
(D.D.C. 1983)
Mexico
Emerging
SEC v. Sam P. Wallace
Co., , 81-CV-1915
(D.D.C. 1981); United
States v. Sam P. Wallace
Co., No. 83-0034 (D.P.R.
1983); United States v.
Rodriguez, 83-0044
Trinidad
&
(D.P.R. 1983)
Tobago
Frontier
United States v. Int’l
Harvester, 82-CR-244
(S.D. Tex. 1982); United
States v. Crawford
Enters., CR-82-224 (S.D.
Tex. 1982); United States
v. Ruston Gas Turbines,
CR-82-207 (S.D. Tex.
1982); United States v.
C.E. Miller Corp., CR-82788 (C.D. Cal. 1982);
United States v. Marquis
King, CR-83-00020
(D.D.C. 1983)
Mexico
Emerging
United States v. Kenny
Int’l Corp., CR-79-3
Less
(D.D.C. 1979)
Cook Islands Developed
United States v. Carver,
(S.D. Fla. 1979)
Qatar
Emerging
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TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

121

72

72

72

n/a
28

76
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Year
1978

1978

1978

1978

1978

1978

1978

Violation
Location

Matter(s)
SEC v. Katy Indus., 78CV-3476 (N.D. Ill. 1978) Indonesia
SEC v. Page Airways,
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C.
1978)
Gabon
SEC v. Page Airways,
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C.
1978)
Malaysia
SEC v. Page Airways,
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C.
1978)
Ivory Coast
SEC v. Page Airways,
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C.
1978)
Morocco
SEC v. Page Airways,
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C.
1978)
Saudi Arabia
SEC v. Page Airways,
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C.
1978)
Uganda
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S&P
Market
Type

TI
CPI
Rating (2008)

Emerging

126

Less
Developed

96

Emerging

47

Frontier

151

Emerging

80

Emerging

80

Less
Developed

126

77

